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Resistance Is Not Futile:
Harnessing the Power of Counter-Offensive
Tactics in Legal Persuasion
Peter Reilly*
A core competency for people working in law or business is the ability to influence and
persuade: People need to become expert at getting others to agree, to go along, and to give
in. The potential “targets” of one’s influence throughout a given workday are seemingly
endless and include clients and customers, co-counsel, opposing counsel, supervisors,
direct reports, contractors, subcontractors, consultants, secretaries, judges, juries,
witnesses, police officers, court personnel, and others. Moreover, that influence is largely
exerted through words spoken and behaviors exhibited within the context of a
negotiation. And yet, leading academics have argued that the vast majority of academic
writing on negotiation has ignored the element of interpersonal influence. This Article
was written to help correct this glaring omission.
This Article underscores the notion that throughout each day, people move rapidly and
fluently between the roles of persuasion “agent” (that is, one who attempts to persuade
others) and persuasion “target” (that is, one whom others attempt to persuade). If an
“agent” party is attempting to persuade, the receiving or “target” party must understand
the various tactics, strategies, and techniques being employed in those attempts, as well as
ways to resist and defend against them. This Article provides this knowledge and
understanding so that all parties, whether agents or targets, can be more effective
negotiators. Those who are not aware that these techniques exist and who cannot
recognize them and resist them place themselves (and their clients) at a clear disadvantage
with respect to negotiation outcomes and final settlement results. It is only by recognizing
and responding to various strategies and techniques of influence and persuasion that
negotiators can begin to resist their powers and nullify their impacts.

* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School;
L.L.M., Georgetown University Law Center; Hewlett Fellow in Conflict Resolution and Legal
Problem-Solving, Georgetown University Law Center (2002–2005). I am grateful for the comments
and guidance I received throughout this project from Cynthia Alkon, Richard Birke, Jonathan Cohen,
Charles Craver, Kay Elliott, Michael Higdon, Kondi Kleinman, Jill Levickas, Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Tim Mulvaney, and Jean Sternlight. I also wish to thank the librarians at Texas Wesleyan School of
Law for their most helpful assistance, as well as Kyla Hand for her excellent research assistance. Of
course, all errors are my own.
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Introduction
1
According to urban legend, casinos in Las Vegas and around the
world rely on numerous subtle ways to influence customers into becoming
the most physically inexhaustible and spend-happy people on earth.
Casinos are said to rely on certain colors (shades of red are allegedly most
effective) for wall coverings, carpets, and furniture because those colors
have been “proven” to keep people awake and spark endless energy
reserves in people. Loud, upbeat music plays in the casino elevators,
putting customers in a festive, money-spending mood as they are delivered
from the parking garage or hotel room floors to the main casino level.
In addition, special machines are said to emit pleasant, moodenhancing perfumes into the air throughout the game-playing areas of
the casino. Other machines are said to ensure oxygen-rich air to enliven
and embolden customers as they continue to play slots and cards for
hours on end. Endless cocktails are delivered free to any game-playing
adults to help loosen up both players and wallets. The carpeting is said to
be designed with confusing and chaotic patterns and colors so people’s
attention will be drawn from the floor back to the slot machines and
gaming tables.
The use of casino “chips” rather than cash makes the stakes (and
losses) seem somehow less real. Restaurants and shops are strategically

1. An urban legend is a story or anecdote “based on hearsay and widely circulated as true.”
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1377 (11th ed. 2005). Information regarding persuasion
strategies and tactics used by casinos can also be found on the Internet, although it is difficult to
corroborate the information as sources and citations are not made available to the reader. See, e.g.,
Casino Tricks to Keep You Gambling, Online Casino & Poker Portal, http://www.online-casinos.co.uk/
Casino/Casino-Gambling-Articles/Casino-Tricks-To-Keep-You-Gambling-740.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2013).
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positioned within the complex so that access is impossible without first
2
walking through game-playing areas. Shills—or game and card players
who are actually casino employees rather than genuine customers—are
said to be planted at tables and machines to stimulate play because, after
all, nobody likes to gamble alone. Slot machines with all sorts of lights,
bells, sirens, and whistles are said to be designed to keep players
entertained, energized, and awake—and to call attention to any payout
that occurs on the floor, no matter the size. Finally, the casinos are said
to rid the game-playing areas of all clocks and windows so people lose
track of time and cannot see outdoors to tell if it’s daytime or nighttime.
All these strategies and tactics of influence and persuasion are said
to be effective because the casino patrons are not aware of them;
therefore, customers are not in the frame of mind to guard against such
measures, or to attempt to resist their impacts. This is precisely what can
happen in the context of negotiation if people are not aware of the
various tactics and strategies that others might employ to influence or
3
persuade, to change one’s mind or alter one’s position.
In other words, in the case of influence and persuasion, awareness
and knowledge truly equal power. This Article aims to help prevent
negotiators from being taken advantage of by persuaders and
manipulators—meaning people who exhibit the full range of ethical and
non-ethical negotiation behaviors seen in the “real world,” from the most
4
honest and transparent to the most dishonest and deceitful —who employ
various strategies and tactics of influence as they attempt to get to yes
and get what they want. Of course, the information set forth can be used
2. Douglas Rushkoff, Coercion: Why We Listen to What “They” Say 95 (1999).
3. As one scholar puts it, human beings have graduated from using physical force as the favored
tool of persuasion, to using “language and metalanguage, with refined functions of the mind.” Sally
Miller Gearhart, The Womanization of Rhetoric, 2 Women’s Stud. Int’l Q. 195, 195 (1979).
4. See Roger Fisher et al., Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving in 132
(2d ed. 1991) (“Perhaps the most common form of dirty trick is misrepresentation about facts,
authority, or intentions.”); Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation 142 (1982) (“A
common ploy is to exaggerate the importance of what one is giving up and to minimize the importance
of what one gets in return. Such posturing is part of the game. In most cultures these self-serving
negotiation stances are expected.”); Geoffrey M. Peters, The Use of Lies in Negotiation, 48 Ohio St.
L.J. 1, 3 (1987) (“It is against the rules for lawyers to lie, but their ability to deceive through other
means is at least accepted and frequently applauded.”). In one survey on lying, attorney respondents
indicated that parties lied about material facts 23% of the time in the non-mediated negotiations in
which they participated. Don Peters, When Lawyers Move Their Lips: Attorney Truthfulness in
Mediation and a Modest Proposal, 2007 J. Disp. Resol. 119, 123 (2007). The survey, on file with
Professor Peters at the University of Florida Levin College of Law, defined material facts as “event,
subject, and other specifics affecting deals or dispute resolutions that fraud law would consider
actionable as going beyond puffing or acceptable exaggeration.” Id. at 123 n.28 (internal quotation
marks omitted). When the general public is polled on their perception of lawyers, the response is
troubling. According to an ABA poll, only 22% of Americans consider lawyers to be “honest and
ethical,” and furthermore, “the more a person knows about the legal profession and the more he or
she is in direct personal contact with lawyers, the lower an individual’s opinion of them.” Gary A.
Hengstler, Vox Populi: The Public Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll 79 A.B.A. J. 60, 62 (1993).
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as either a sword (to influence and persuade others) or as a shield (to
5
resist or defend oneself against persuasion attempts made by others).
Moreover, the more skillfully one can identify, employ, and resist
strategies and tactics of influence and persuasion, the better one can
negotiate. As one expert in negotiation adroitly pointed out over thirty
6
years ago: “[A] tactic perceived is no tactic.”
This Article was also written to explore both the theory and practice
of the issues involved and to attempt to link the two. As Carrie Menkel7
Meadow reminds us: Lawyers need to know both theory and skills. As
human relations expert Mary Parker Follett might put it, I hope to shed
light on how one can bring insights on this topic from the theoretical
8
“mind” level to the behavioral “motor” level. Much of the following
information is fairly straightforward and, with mindful effort and
minimal practice, can be immediately applied to everyday personal and
professional negotiations.
Some of the persuasion concepts and tactics discussed in this Article
have been studied and written about in other areas of academia
(marketing, political science, psychology, communication, rhetoric, social
work, etc.), and yet, for whatever reason, negotiation scholars across the
disciplines have largely failed to adequately shine a spotlight on this
information. As Deepak Malhotra and Max Bazerman state, “the vast
majority of writing on negotiation has ignored the element of
interpersonal influence. Because negotiators spend a great deal of time
5. See Marian Friestad & Peter Wright, The Persuasion Knowledge Model: How People Cope with
Persuasion Attempts, 21 J. Consumer Res. 1, 3 (1994) (“In everyday life, people often move rapidly and
fluently between the roles of target and agent. Their persuasion knowledge supports this flexibility by
providing them with the resources necessary to do the basic tasks of persuasion coping and persuasion
production. There is presumably a fairly close connection, therefore, between people’s coping knowledge
and what they know that helps them plan, construct, and execute their own influence attempts.”).
6. Herb Cohen, You Can Negotiate Anything 138 (1980).
7. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What’s Missing from
the MacCrate Report—of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 593, 595
(1994) (“I hope to . . . expose . . . the false dualism of so-called intellectual rigor in legal ideas and
‘science’ and the presumed ‘weakness’ of skills training by demonstrating that both theory and skills
are ‘legal science’ and rigorous, and both are also incomplete and partial statements of what a lawyer
needs to know.”); see also John C. Kleefeld, Rethinking ‘Like a Lawyer’: An Incrementalist’s Proposal
for First-Year Curriculum Reform, 53 J. Legal Educ. 254, 255 (2003). Kleefeld suggests the creation of
a first-year course that:
in an integrated fashion, aims to instill a culture of professional competence and ethics while
at the same time laying the foundation for reflective and critical thinking about law. I do not
subscribe to the dichotomous view that lawyerly and scholarly competencies are vying
concepts; both are important, and the development of one influences and informs
development of the other. We need scholarly practitioners; we also need practical scholars.
The course I envision—one that would supplement, rather than supplant, doctrinal
analysis—aims to nurture both types of competency.
Id.
8. Albie Davis, An Interview with Mary Parker Follett, in Negotiation Theory and Practice 17
(William Breslin & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1991).
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trying to persuade each other to agree to their desired outcome, this
9
seems to be a glaring omission.”
This Article will begin to help correct this omission. More specifically,
I hope this Article can be used to help persuade those who run law schools
(meaning professors, deans, trustees, and other people occupying teaching,
administrative, and leadership posts) to make a greater effort to
incorporate the theory and practice of persuasion into the school
curriculum. I concur with Gerald Wetlaufer’s opinion that “law is the very
profession of rhetoric. We are the sons and daughters of Gorgias
10
himself.”
Similarly, Michael Smith argues that lawyers are the guardians of
three important bodies of knowledge: “critical analysis, argumentation,
11
and persuasion.” Yet the opportunity for law students to learn the
theory and application of persuasion principles and mechanisms seems
largely limited to the following courses: (1) Trial Advocacy or Appellate
Advocacy (which teach students how to persuade a court or jury through
the written and/or spoken word); (2) Legal Research and Writing (which
teaches students how to persuade courts or other lawyers through the
written word); and (3) courses in ADR (or “appropriate” dispute
12
resolution as many now call it ), which touch on issues of persuasion in
13
the context of negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. Of those courses,
the only required course for law students at most schools is Legal
Research and Writing. I would argue that a unit entitled “Persuasion

9. Deepak Malhotra & Max H. Bazerman, Psychological Influence in Negotiation: An
Introduction Long Overdue, 34 J. Mgmt. 509, 510 (2008). Scholars have long pointed out that
persuasion is a core or central element of the negotiation process. One prominent scholar of
negotiation declared nearly three decades ago: “Negotiation consists of assessment, persuasion, and
exchange. Combined, these processes account for most of the actions a negotiator takes and most of
the stages through which a negotiation proceeds.” Robert J. Condlin, ‘Cases on Both Sides’: Patterns of
Argument in Legal Dispute-Negotiation, 44 Md. L. Rev. 65, 67 (1985).
10. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1545, 1554–55
(1990). Note that Aristotle defined rhetoric as “the faculty of observing in any given case the available
means of persuasion.” Aristotle, Rhetoric bk. I, in Rhetoric and Poetics 19, 24 (W. Rhys Roberts &
Ingram Bywater trans., 1984). Note, too, that Gorgias (c. 485–380 B.C.) was a Greek sophist, pre-Socratic
philosopher, and rhetorician. Along with Protagoras, Gorgias forms the first generation of Sophists.
11. Michael R. Smith, Advanced Legal Writing: Theories and Strategies in Persuasive
Writing 363 (2d ed. 2008).
12. Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow states, “We now call it ‘appropriate dispute resolution,’ rather
than ‘alternative dispute resolution,’ precisely to signal that different processes may be appropriate for
different kinds of disputes or in different types of settings.” Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR: The
Many “Cs” of Professional Responsibility and Dispute Resolution, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 979, 979–80
(2001).
13. There are numerous legal advocacy and legal writing books containing important sections on
rhetoric and persuasion. See, e.g., Carole C. Berry, Effective Appellate Advocacy: Brief Writing
and Oral Argument (3d ed. 2003); Charles R. Calleros, Legal Method and Writing (5th ed.
2006); David C. Frederick, The Art of Oral Advocacy (2003); Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Nancy L.
Schultz, Persuasive Writing for Lawyers and the Legal Profession (2d ed. 2001).

Reilly_22 (D. Barca) (Do Not Delete)

May 2013]

5/24/2013 3:53 PM

COUNTER-OFFENSIVE TACTICS IN LEGAL PERSUASION
14

1177

15

Knowledge” should be incorporated into that course, thereby ensuring
that all law school graduates, nationwide, are introduced to the power
and immediate relevancy of material that is useful in the broadest sense,
given its applicability to a vast array of legal and business problems and
16
practice areas. Two persuasion knowledge scholars underscore the
ubiquity of the topic in everyday (professional and non-professional) life:
In everyday life, people often move rapidly and fluently between the
roles of [persuasion] target and agent. Their persuasion knowledge
supports this flexibility by providing them the resources necessary to
do the basic tasks of persuasion coping and persuasion production. . . .
Once we appreciate the many functions that persuasion knowledge
performs, its value and scope become apparent. It is a resource to
which people must have immediate access during any interaction in
which the need may arise to recognize and manage, or to construct and
17
deliver, a persuasion attempt.

Lawyers, businesspeople, and anyone else involved in day-to-day
negotiations are constantly moving between the roles of persuasion agent
and persuasion target. If one negotiation party is making attempts to
persuade, the receiving or “target” party should have an understanding
of the various tactics and techniques that are being employed in those
attempts, as well as possible defenses thereto. This Article attempts to
provide this knowledge and understanding so that all parties, whether
agents or targets, can be more effective in the negotiation.
The Article is divided into three Parts: Part I sets forth working
definitions of persuasion and resistance (including the so-called “four
faces” of resistance as they relate to persuasion—reactance, distrust,
scrutiny, and inertia).

14. See generally Friestad & Wright, supra note 5; see also Sherman J. Clark, The Character of
Persuasion, 1 Ave Maria L. Rev. 61, 68 (2003) (“[T]here are risks inherent in the fact that we are not
always conscious of exactly what we do when we persuade. The most obvious risk is simply that we may
be less successful than we could be if we were willing to give the matter more thought. Even elite athletes
devote a certain amount of attention to mechanics, if not during a game then in practice.” (emphasis
added)).
15. Another option could be to create a “mini-course” in legal persuasion that is shorter in length
than the more traditional courses such as property, contracts, civil procedure, or torts. Indeed, the
mini-course could be modeled after a course taught by Professor Howard Sacks at Northwestern Law
School during the 1957–58 school year. The course, entitled “Professional Relations,” was offered
without credit and was taught (in four classes lasting two hours each) over the span of two weeks. Howard
R. Sacks, Human-Relations Training for Students and Lawyers, 11 J. Legal Educ. 316, 322 (1959).
16. Persuasion can be a necessary component of obtaining resolution in various kinds of matters
and disputes that are oftentimes settled outside the courtroom, including adoptions, mergers, wills,
contracts, incorporations, and divorces. Moreover, persuasion can be a central element in resolving
criminal cases that don’t go to trial, as plea bargaining accounts for the vast majority of outcomes of
criminal cases. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea
Bargaining, 91 Marq. L. Rev. 163, 163 n.1 (2007) (discussing how plea bargaining, despite its critics,
“shows no sign of decreasing in importance”).
17. Friestad & Wright, supra note 5, at 3.
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Part II discusses persuasion and resistance more generally in the
context of negotiation. It also sets forth several important models and
theoretical foundations to provide a context for understanding different
types of persuasion, as well as various principles and mechanisms involved
in both giving and receiving persuasion messages. Included in this Part will
be a discussion of the Elaboration Likelihood Model, Inoculation Theory,
the Approach-Avoidance Conflict Model, Alpha-Omega persuasion
strategies, and Robert Cialdini’s six “weapons” of influence.
Part III, the core of this Article, offers information, rooted in
empirical research, regarding different strategies, tactics, and mindsets
that persuaders employ as they attempt to get what they want through
negotiation. Specifically, I offer strategies and tactics parties might exhibit
or implement to persuade and influence people during a negotiation. In
discussing the techniques, I hope to convey a sense of how the particular
strategy works, why it is effective and, perhaps most important of all, how
one can effectively resist it or defend oneself against it.
Although this Article is targeted to lawyers and businesspeople, the
suggestions I offer are applicable to those working in any other field,
occupation, or circumstance where people interact with other people,
negotiate, and work to achieve solutions and agreements acceptable to
all parties involved.

I. Resistance and Persuasion: Toward Definitions
A. Definition of Persuasion
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines persuasion as
“an act or the action of influencing the mind by arguments or reasons
offered or by anything that moves the mind or passions or inclines the
will to a determination,” or “the condition of having the mind influenced
18
(as to decision, acceptance, or belief) from without.”
Two leading scholars in the field of persuasion define it as “a
conscious attempt by one individual to change the attitudes, beliefs, or
behavior of another individual or group of individuals through the
19
transmission of some message.” Persuasion, then, falls short of the more
20
blatant “coercion.” While coercion might take the form of using guns or
economic sanctions to “get to yes,” persuasion relies on the power of
verbal and non-verbal communication.

18. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1688 (1993).
19. Erwin P. Bettinghaus & Michael J. Cody, Persuasive Communication 3 (4th ed. 1987).
20. But see Gerald R. Miller, On Being Persuaded, in The Persuasion Handbook: Developments
in Theory and Practice 3, 4 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002) (“[M]uch persuasive
discourse is indirectly coercive; that is, the persuasive effectiveness of messages often depends heavily
on the credibility of threats and promises proffered by the communicator.”).
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B. Definition of Resistance
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines resistance as
“the act or an instance of resisting,” the “power or capacity to resist,” or
21
“an opposing force.” Resistance can be an outcome (that is, the
outcome or end result of being able to withstand change and not be
moved despite pressure to change), or it can be a motivational state (that
is, having the motivation to oppose change, to put up oppositional force
against pressures of influence and change, regardless of whether, in the
end, that force of resistance is effective or ineffective).
Some people are more resistant to persuasion than others simply due
to individual differences in personal traits such as intelligence and
22
personality. In addition, there will be certain issues that are so important
to people—that are so fundamentally imbedded into the core of what they
23
think, feel, and believe—that movement on the issue is effectively
24
25
impossible. Someone’s stance on abortion might be such an issue. A
person’s fanatical allegiance to a particular athletic team might be another.
Before a negotiation begins, then, it can be helpful to learn if there
are certain attitudes that will not move—that are of such high importance
that they are surrounded by a seemingly impenetrable wall of resistance
to influence and change.
Scholars of influence suggest that toward any given issue, a person’s
26
“attitude importance” will generally be high or low. Moreover, when a
person’s highly important attitudes are threatened, the person will have a
strong reaction both emotionally (with increased anger and irritation)
27
and cognitively (with increased counterarguments). For example, in one

21. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1932 (1993).
22. Scholars in the area of influence and persuasion suggest that people who are highly intelligent,
people who have a high need for cognition (meaning they like to think deeply, thoroughly, and
carefully about any given issue), and people who are highly argumentative (meaning they like to argue
and attack other people’s positions), tend to be more resistant to influence and persuasion than other
people. See generally Curits P. Haugtvedt & Richard E. Petty, Personality and Persuasion: Need for
Cognition Moderates the Persistence and Resistance of Attitude Changes, 63 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 308 (1992); Dean Kazoleas, The Impact of Argumentativeness on Resistance to Persuasion, 20
Hum. Comm. Res. 118 (1993); Nancy Rhodes & Wendy Wood, Self-Esteem and Intelligence Affect
Influenceability: The Mediating Role of Message Reception, 111 Psychol. Bull. 156 (1992).
23. See generally Peter Reilly, Teaching Law Students How to Feel: Using Negotiations Training to
Increase Emotional Intelligence, 21 Negotiation J. 301 (2005).
24. See Stanley Feldman, Structure and Consistency in Public Opinion: The Role of Core Beliefs
and Values, 32 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 416, 422 n.2 (1988).
25. See Brad J. Sagarin & Sarah E. Wood, Resistance to Influence, in The Science of Social
Influence: Advances and Future Progress 321, 323 (Anthony R. Pratkanis ed., 2007) (“Attitudes
about abortion . . . are often connected to attitudes about religion, morality, freedom, personal liberty,
women’s rights, and so on. Such deeply embedded attitudes are resistant to change because a change
in one attitude threatens to cause an uncomfortable state of imbalance or a cascade of changes to
other attitudes.” (internal citation omitted)).
26. Id. at 322.
27. Id.
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experiment, people in favor of allowing gays into the military were shown
28
a speech arguing strongly against that position. Half of the participants
were “high” in attitude importance on the issue (meaning they agreed with
statements such as, “My attitude towards gays in the military is very
29
important to me personally”). The other half of the participants were
“low” in attitude importance on the issue (meaning they agreed with
30
statements like, “I don’t have very intense feelings about this issue”).
The speech contained five strong arguments in opposition to gays in
the military, such as, “Gays in the military undermine unit cohesion and
31
therefore combat performance.” Participants listened to the speech and
then reported (1) their emotional reactions to the speech (such as anger
or happiness), (2) their cognitive reactions to the speech (such as
counterarguments to what they were hearing), and (3) their post-speech
32
attitudes regarding gays in the military.
It was determined, not surprisingly, that even though all the
participants began the study in favor of gays in the military, the
participants who were “low” in attitude importance were significantly less
successful in defending their attitudes than were participants who were
33
“high” in attitude importance. Indeed, the latter exhibited strong
resistance to the speech both emotionally (with anger) and cognitively
34
(with more counterarguments). The investigators concluded that these
quick and forceful emotional and cognitive responses will occur in a
35
person whenever issues high in attitude importance are threatened.
With this research in mind, it is important for negotiators to try to
get a sense, through early discussions, if other parties have certain issues
that are high in attitude importance. Obviously, the emotional and
cognitive responses generated when discussing those issues will shed light
on their relative importance. In the end, it might be possible to win
favorable movement on those issues, but doing so could require significant
expenditure of resources and/or concessions.
C. The Four Faces of Resistance
Eric Knowles and Jay Linn, two experts in the area of resistance in
persuasion, describe what they call the “four faces” of resistance:
36
reactance, distrust, scrutiny, and inertia. They suggest that these are not
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Eric S. Knowles & Jay A. Linn, The Importance of Resistance to Persuasion, in Resistance
and Persuasion 6, 7 (Eric S. Knowles & Jay A. Linn eds., 2004).
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different kinds of resistance, but rather “different perceptual stances
toward it, much the same way an object viewed from four directions may
37
present varied retinal projections but still be seen as the same entity.”
The “four faces” are introduced to underscore that the more knowledge
readers have about resistance, the more mindful and effective they will
become in both persuading others and in resisting persuasion attempts
made by others.
1.

Reactance

Jack Brehm coined the term “reactance” to refer to the negative
emotional reaction people feel when they believe someone else is
38
threatening to eliminate their choices in life, or their range of alternatives.
When one person attempts to influence another person, the target can feel
reactance, which motivates the target to resist the influence attempt and to
39
protect or restore the threatened freedom(s). Reactance can be displayed
in numerous ways, including opposition, disobedience, obstinacy,
40
contrariness, or passive aggression.
Brehm identified two variables that contribute to the intensity (or
lack of intensity) of reactance displayed: (1) the nature of the attempt at
41
influence; and (2) the number and importance of the freedoms at stake.
Regarding the first variable, if the attempt at influence is coercive,
unwanted, or seemingly arbitrary, then reactance will be more intense.
Likewise, if the influence attempt is more collaborative, indirect and
subtle, or seemingly justified, then reactance will be more muted. And
regarding the second variable, reactance will become stronger and more
intense as the threatened freedoms become more numerous and more
42
important to the person.
2.

Distrust

In the context of negotiation, people can become defensive and
guarded when counterparts make proposals, offers, or suggestions for
change. The party receiving the proposals and offers usually wants to
know all the facts and circumstances surrounding the issues involved, as

37. Id. at 6.
38. See generally Jack W. Brehm, A Theory of Psychological Reactance (1966); Sharon S.
Brehm & Jack W. Brehm, Psychological Reactance: A Theory of Freedom and Control (1981).
39. See Donald A Saucier & Russell J. Webster, Social Vigilantism: Measuring Individual
Differences in Belief Superiority and Resistance to Persuasion 36 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull.
19, 21 (2010) (“The motivational state of reactance may . . . produce efforts to reassert one’s freedom
through oppositional behavior (e.g., by resisting the restrictions, exhibiting backlash effects, or
aggressing against the agent imposing restrictions).”).
40. See generally Brehm, supra note 38.
41. Jack W. Brehm, Psychological Reactance: Theory and Applications, in 16 Advances in
Consumer Research 72, 72–75 (Thomas K. Srull, ed., 1989).
42. Id.
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well as the motives of all other parties to the negotiation. Until this
43
information can be obtained, a sense of distrust can permeate the process.
3.

Scrutiny/Skepticism

When people realize that someone is trying to influence them (e.g.,
through requests, pleas, or persuasive messages), they oftentimes react
44
by turning highly focused attention toward the matter at hand. Every
part of the request or message is thoroughly examined, tested, evaluated,
and questioned. The scrutiny can lead to finding real or imagined
weaknesses in the message or proposal, which in turn can lead to counterargument, counter-proposals, ambivalence, doubt, or outright rejection.
This seems to be especially true for lawyers, largely because of the
decisionmaking style that tends to be dominant among lawyers when
compared to people in the general population. Specifically, based upon
45
results of the widely used Myers-Briggs Type Indicator personality test,
about 73% of male law students and 60% of female law students prefer
46
“Thinking” as their decisionmaking style. In the general population,
only about 60% of males and 35% of females prefer “Thinking” as their
47
decisionmaking style. Researchers conclude that the “Thinking” style
people “prefer to come to closure in a logical, orderly manner,” and they
48
“can readily discern inaccuracies and are often critical.” Lawyers having
the “Thinking” decisionmaking style are particularly effective at exhibiting
both scrutiny and skepticism while analyzing data and arguments in the
context of negotiation.
4.

Inertia

Inertia is the desire to not change; the quality focuses not so much
on resisting change as it does on simply staying put or staying the same.

43. See Roy J. Lewicki et al., Trust and Distrust: New Relationships and Realities, 23 Acad. Mgmt.
Rev. 438, 439 (July 1998) (defining trust in terms of “confident positive expectations regarding
another’s . . . words, actions, and decisions”).
44. R.E. Petty & J.T. Cacioppo, Communication and Persuasion: Central and Peripheral
Routes to Attitude Change (1986).
45. The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator is one of the most extensively used personality tests in the
world. The test provides scores on four continua: Introversion/Extraversion, Sensing/Intuiting,
Thinking/Feeling, and Judging/Perception. The Myers-Briggs “type” of law students and lawyers has been
investigated in several studies, all of which report the prevalence of “Thinking” over “Feeling.” See Paul
Van R. Miller, Personality Differences and Student Survival in Law School, 19 J. Legal Educ. 460, 465–66
(1967); Frank L. Natter, The Human Factor: Psychological Type in Legal Education, 3 Res. Psychol.
Type 55, 55–67 (1981); Vernellia R. Randall, The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, First Year Law Students
and Performance, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 63, 80–81, 91–92, 96–97 (1995); Lawrence R. Richard, Psychological
Type and Job Satisfaction Among Practicing Lawyers in the United States, 29 Cap. U. L. Rev. 979, 1008–19
(2002).
46. Susan J. Bell, Full Disclosure: Do You Really Want to Be a Lawyer? 152 (2d ed. 1992).
47. Id.
48. Id.
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The goal, then, is to avoid disrupting the status quo, initiating new actions,
49
or spending energy considering the merits of new ideas or proposals.
Inertia can mean unresponsiveness to the persuader, or inattentiveness to
the details and specifics of the offer, proposal, or persuasion message.
Indeed, the persuader usually experiences this kind of resistance as
50
passivity, avoidance, or disengagement.
Again, the “four faces” are introduced to underscore that the more
knowledge readers have about resistance, the more mindful and effective
they will become in both persuading others and in resisting persuasion
attempts made by others. Indeed, the ability to recognize the four faces in
oneself or in negotiation counterparts can help a person to decrease or
altogether overcome the role they play in resistance.
For example, a counterpart’s strong reactance or skepticism displayed
upon hearing a particular proposal can be seen as more of a process stage
that the counterpart is temporarily passing through on a longer journey
toward ultimate agreement. In fact, recognizing such a stage within the
negotiation could become something one does on a routine basis when
he or she “goes to the balcony” during a negotiation. William Ury
eloquently describes going to the balcony thusly:
When you find yourself facing a difficult negotiation, you need to step
back, collect your wits, and see the situation objectively. Imagine you are
negotiating on a stage and then imagine yourself climbing onto a balcony
overlooking the stage. The “balcony” is a metaphor for a mental attitude
of detachment. From the balcony you can calmly evaluate the conflict
almost as if you were a third party. You can think constructively for both
51
sides and look for a mutually satisfactory way to resolve the problem.

As Ury notes, going to the balcony allows negotiators to distance
52
themselves from their “natural impulses and emotions.” It is this ability
that allows one to understand that, yes, one of the “four faces” of
resistance can be detected arising either in oneself or in one’s negotiation
counterpart. Through mindfulness and “going to the balcony,” the
negotiator is able to either (1) increase her own resistance to being
persuaded in that particular negotiation, or (2) to work to patiently
overcome the counterpart’s resistance, whether it be through ongoing
conversations, intervention by third parties, references to objective
criteria, or another tactic.

49. Knowles & Linn, supra note 36, at 7–8.
50. See James Wallihan, Negotiating to Avoid Agreement, 14 Negotiation J. 257, 257 (1998)
(discussing what the author calls “avoidance bargaining” or “the use of negotiation for the purpose of
avoiding agreement” (emphasis omitted)).
51. William Ury, Getting Past No: Negotiating Your Way from Confrontation to
Cooperation 37–38 (1993).
52. Id. at 38.
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II. Resistance and Persuasion: Building a Context
A good deal of activity in the fields of law and business involves
persuasion, that is, getting people to approach things in a certain way, to
resolve things in a particular manner, to go along with this or that idea—
in short to agree, to give in, or to relent. The context might be formal or
informal; it might be a client interview, negotiation, mediation, arbitration,
administrative hearing, pre-litigation conference, court battle, or
settlement conference. Whatever the context, lawyers spend their
working hours dealing with and trying to persuade all kinds of people
(including clients, witnesses, judges, secretaries, police officers, court
officers, other lawyers, etc.) to do all manner of things in all kinds of
53
situations. As one scholar puts it: “We lawyers are generally counted as
successful in the degree to which we are effective at producing
54
instrumental results through our strategic speaking.”
Of course, this Article will also address tools and behaviors of
persuasion that go beyond mere words and “strategic speaking.” First,
however, it is important to understand that persuasion comes in different
packages or forms that people have for centuries attempted to organize
and categorize.
A. Two Fundamental Types of Persuasion
The idea that there are two fundamental types of persuasion can be
traced at least to Aristotle, who made a distinction between persuasion
involving emotion and passion (pathos) and persuasion involving reason
and logic (logos). Aristotle’s Rhetoric is the earliest authoritative analysis
of persuasive discourse and argumentative techniques and is the source
55
of numerous Roman treatises on the topic. Roman rhetoricians and
56
57
lawyers like Cicero and Quintilian, relying on Aristotle’s rhetorical
53. James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation,
1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 926, 927 (1980) (discussing negotiation as an “almost galactic” process by
which one “deals with the opposing side in war, with terrorists, with labor or management in a labor
agreement, with buyers and sellers of goods, services, and real estate, with lessors, with governmental
agencies, and with one’s clients, acquaintances, and family”). See generally John Lande, Teaching
Students to Negotiate like a Lawyer, 39 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 109 (2012).
54. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 1219, 1220 (1990)
(emphasis added). See generally Art Hinshaw & Jess K. Alberts, Doing the Right Thing: An Empirical
Study of Attorney Negotiation Ethics, 16 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 95 (2011).
55. The term “rhetoric” sometimes refers to a rhetorical treatise written by a Greek or Roman
author. Rhetoric is also used in the way that Aristotle would use it: the “faculty [or power] of
discovering in the particular case what are the available means of persuasion.” Aristotle, The
Rhetoric of Aristotle bk. VII (Lane Cooper trans. 1932).
56. Marcus Tullius Cicero (circa 106–45 B.C.) was a Roman statesman, lawyer, and teacher whose
major works on rhetoric include De Oratore, Brutus, and Oratore.
57. See Marius Fabius Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria 397 (H.E. Butler trans., 1954) (“There
are . . . three aims which the orator must always have in view; he must instruct, move, and charm his
hearers.”). Marius Fabius Quintilian (circa 35–95 A.D.) was a Roman teacher of public speaking and
rhetoric whose major rhetorical work is Institutio Oratoria.
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analyses, divided persuasive discourse, (and legal arguments in particular),
into three separate categories: (1) logical argument, or logos; (2) ethical
58
appeal or credibility, or ethos; and (3) emotional argument, or pathos. As
Cicero wrote more than two thousand years ago regarding the persuasive
power contained within human emotion: “For men decide far more
problems by hate, or love, or lust, or rage, or sorrow, or joy, or hope, or
fear, or illusion, or some other inward emotion, than by reality, or
59
authority, or any legal standard, or judicial precedent, or statute.”
A strong academic interest in the topic of persuasion was jumpstarted in America during World War II. Specifically, psychologist Carl
Hovland and his colleagues were asked by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and his administration to investigate how to boost soldier
morale and persuade them to want to continue fighting against the
60
Japanese.
Later, Hovland and his colleagues worked to discover the sequences
of information-processing states that are central to the success of
persuasive communication. They suggested that persuasion entailed
learning message arguments and that it occurred in a series of steps.
Specifically, in order to be persuaded, individuals had to attend to,
61
comprehend, learn, accept, and retain the message. This made intuitive
sense to other scholars in the area; indeed, there is evidence that learning
can be one component of persuasion—the more people learn and
comprehend message arguments, the more likely they are to accept the
62
positions being advocated.
Yet the early work of Hovland and his colleagues missed the mark
in that it assumes the listener is a passive, sponge-like creature instead of

58. Note that while classical rhetoricians created these three separate categories for purposes of
analysis and discussion, they did not consider ethos, logos, and pathos as being completely separable
from each other. Rather, each category is connected to, and helps define, the other two. See
Aristotle, supra note 55, bk. VIII (Lane Cooper trans., 1932); see also John W. Cooley, A Classical
Approach to Mediation—Part I: Classical Rhetoric and the Art of Persuasion in Mediation, 19 Dayton
L. Rev. 83, 92–93 (1993). For an article that links the ancient Greek and Roman rhetoricians to
modern legal advocacy, see Michael Frost, Ethos, Pathos & Legal Audience, 99 Dick. L. Rev. 85
(1994). For a general discussion of ethos, logos, and pathos, see Steven D. Jamar, Aristotle Teaches
Persuasion: The Psychic Connection, 8 Scribes J. Leg. Writing 61, 72–78 (2001–2002).
59. Walter R. Fisher, Human Communications as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason,
Value and Action 37 (1987) (quoting Cicero’s De Oratore). Aristotle had an extensive treatment of
emotions in his treatise Rhetoric. He discusses emotions in pairs of opposite emotions, (one negative and
one positive), in keeping with his concept of balance in rhetoric. The pairs include the following: (1) anger
and calmness; (2) enmity and friendliness; (3) fear and confidence; (4) shame and shamelessness;
(5) unkindliness and kindliness; (6) pity and indignation; and (7) envy and emulation. Cooley, supra note
58, at 101 (citing Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse 124–72 (George A. Kennedy
trans., 1991)).
60. C.I. Hovland et al., Experiments on Mass Communications (1949).
61. C.I. Hovland et al., Communication and Persuasion (1953).
62. See generally Shelly Chaiken et al., Principles of Persuasion, in Social Psychology: Handbook
of Basic Principles 702 (E.T. Higgins & A.W. Kruglanski eds., 1996).
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an active, thinking person whose own mental reactions to messages play
a critical role in the process of persuasion. As one investigator puts it:
[A listener] does not sit there listening and absorbing what is said
without any counteraction on his part. Indeed, it is more likely that
under such circumstances, while he is listening to the persuasive
communication, he is very actively, inside his own mind, counter-arguing,
derogating the points the communicator makes, and derogating the
63
communicator himself.

Researchers spent the next forty years investigating this interactive
process between the source of the persuasive message, and the target of
that message. Finally, in 1986, two scholars took this research and
produced an integrated model called the Elaboration Likelihood Model
64
(“ELM”). When investigating persuasion, current scholars tend to focus
on this model because it has generated a tremendous amount of research
and offers a comprehensive framework for understanding communication
effects:
[N]ot only did the ELM take the various existing theories of persuasion
and organize them . . . it also took the multitude of processes by which
variables could impact attitudes that were articulated in prior research
and theory
and organized them into a finite set, specifying when they
65
operated.

B. Elaboration Likelihood Model
66

ELM was proposed by Richard Petty and John Cacioppo.
Elaboration refers to the extent to which a person thinks about (or
67
mentally modifies) arguments contained in a given communication.
Likelihood (referring to the probability that an event will occur) is used to
68
state that elaboration can be either likely or unlikely. Elaboration is
assumed to fall along a continuum: On one end, a person thinks deeply
about a given issue; on the other end, a person gives very little active
thought or mental energy to the issue. ELM, then, suggests when people
should be particularly likely to elaborate, or not elaborate, on persuasive
69
messages.
In ELM, there are two routes to persuasion: the “central route” and
the “peripheral route.” The “central route” allows one to carefully

63. Leon Festinger & Nathan Maccoby, On Resistance to Persuasive Communications, 68 J.
Abnormal & Soc. Psychol. 359, 360 (1964).
64. See Richard E. Petty & Pablo Brinol, Persuasion: From Single to Multiple to Metacognitive
Process, 3 Persp. on Psychol. Sci. 137, 143 (2008).
65. Id. at 140.
66. See generally Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, The Elaboration Likelihood Model of
Persuasion, in 19 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 124 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986).
67. Id. at 128.
68. Id. at 128–29.
69. Richard M. Perloff, The Dynamics of Persuasion: Communication and Attitudes in the
21st Century 130 (4th ed. 2010).
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scrutinize the content and quality of an offer, proposal, or persuasion
message, check for internal consistency, and consider the arguments (are
they strong or weak?), the reasoning (is it logical?), and conclusions (are
they reasonable given the available information and evidence?) in light
70
of one’s own beliefs, experiences, and stored knowledge. People tend to
rely on the “central route” when the issue at hand is important and
highly relevant to their lives. Moreover, persuasion through this route
71
has been shown to: (1) be more durable and resistant to change and
(2) entail a great deal of mental effort, requiring both deliberate
72
attention and allocation of mental resources.
The “peripheral route” to persuasion, on the other hand, relies less on
deep thinking and processing of rational appeals. Instead, people are
influenced by “peripheral cues,” or various factors that can produce
attitude change without one having to actively think about the matter
under consideration. In those instances, the persuader will turn to
emotionally persuasive appeals, ranging from humor to sympathy to fear.
Or the persuader will rely on simple persuasion cues and factors, such as
(1) source credibility displayed through professional status, social status, or
job title, (2) the number of arguments (or length of arguments) put forth in
the persuasion message, (3) physical attractiveness of the source, or
(4) confidence in presentation as exhibited through eye contact, body
73
74
posture and gestures, facial expressions, and speaking style (such as
75
tone, volume, speed, and accent). People tend to rely on the “peripheral

70. See generally Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, Communication and Persuasion: Central
and Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change (1986).
71. Kipling D. Williams & Lara Dolnik, Revealing the Worst First: Stealing Thunder as a Social
Influence Strategy, in Social Influence: Direct and Indirect Processes 213, 227 (Joseph P. Forgas &
Kipling D. Williams eds., 2001).
72. Alison Ledgerwood et al., Changing Minds: Persuasion in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in
The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice 455, 458 (Morton Deutsch et al. eds.,
2006).
73. For an excellent discussion of the role of facial expressions, eye contact, and body posture and
gestures as they relate to nonverbal persuasion, see Michael J. Higdon, Oral Argument and Impression
Management: Harnessing the Power of Nonverbal Persuasion for a Judicial Audience, 57 Kan. L. Rev.
631, 642–47 (2009).
74. For excellent advice on how to persuade a judge, see Judge Gerald Lebovits, Winning
Through Integrity and Professionalism, The Advocate (Bronx County Bar Ass’n), Summer 2009, at 14
(“Understate; never overstate. Less is more. Overstatement is unethical while quiet understatement
persuades . . . . While arguing to judges, lawyers should speak about passionate subjects without
speaking passionately. Passionate performances might convince juries but not judges.”).
75. Jansen Voss, The Science of Persuasion: An Exploration of Advocacy and the Science Behind the
Art of Persuasion in the Courtroom, 29 Law & Psychol. Rev. 301, 309 (2005) (“Varying the speed of one’s
speech affects credibility and helps create a temporal framework for events or actions. Studies show that
‘rapid speaking (to a point) tends to increase believability,’ while ‘unnaturally slow speech is [perceived]
as an indicator of uncertainty . . . .’” (alterations in original) (footnote omitted)); see Craig Lambert, The
Psyche on Automatic: Amy Cuddy Probes Snap Judgments, Warm Feelings, and How to Become an
‘Alpha Dog’, Harv. Magazine, Nov.–Dec. 2010, at 48, 52 (discussing cutting-edge work by Lakshmi
Balachandra, a Fellow at Harvard Law School’s Program on Negotiation, whose research indicates that
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route” when the issue at hand is of minor importance, when there is not
enough time (or too much distraction) to think deeply about the issue, or
76
when the issue has little relevance in their lives.
C. Resistance, Persuasion, and Inoculation Theory
Resistance and persuasion are part of a back-and-forth process.
Specifically, resistance is the tug-of-war partner with persuasion: One
party targets a second party with a persuasion message, the targeted
party (sometimes) resists, and then the first party attempts to overcome
that resistance. And on and on it goes in a cyclical fashion. As two
persuasion scholars jointly state, “Just as it takes two opposing teams for
a tug-of-war competition, resistance and persuasion are opposing yet
77
integral parts of a persuasive interaction.” However, if one is not armed
with knowledge about a particular persuasion strategy or tactic, she can
fall prey to it without even realizing what happened. Only if the tactic or
strategy put forth by the first party is recognized and understood by the
targeted party can it then be resisted.
William McGuire first identified that persuasion and resistance to
78
79
persuasion form a dynamic process. McGuire identified motivation and

the success of venture-capital pitches to investors is influenced more by nonverbal factors such as
“calmness,” “passion,” “eye contact,” and “lack of awkwardness” than by the content of the
presentations. Professor Amy Cuddy says the research indicates that the success of venture-capital pitches
to investors turns on factors like “how comfortable and charismatic you are. The predictors of who
actually gets the money are all about how you present yourself, and nothing to do with content.”).
76. See generally Petty & Cacioppo, supra note 70; see also Perloff, supra note 69, at 133–35;
Chaiken, supra note 62, at 711–12; Carsten K. W. de Dreu, Motivation in Negotiation: A Social
Psychological Analysis, in The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture 114, 121 (Michele J. Gelfand &
Jeanne M. Brett eds., 2004) (“[N]egotiators with high epistemic motivation are more likely to engage in
deliberate, deep, and systematic processing of available information, and they search additional
information about the task and their opponent. Negotiators with low epistemic motivation, in contrast,
are more likely to engage in heuristic processing of information.”); Ülkü D. Demirdögen, The Roots of
Research in (Political) Persuasion: Ethos, Pathos, Logos and the Yale Studies of Persuasive
Communications, 3 Int’l J. Soc. Inquiry 189, 196 n.1 (2010); Petty & Brinol, supra note 64, at 140–41;
Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions? 6 S.
Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 1, 22–25 (1997); Brad J. Sagarin et al., Dispelling the Illusion of Invulnerability: The
Motivations and Mechanisms of Resistance to Persuasion, 83 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 526, 528 (2002);
Donna Shestowsky, Psychology and Persuasion, in The Negotiator’s Fieldbook: The Desk Reference
for the Experienced Negotiator 362, 363–66 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds.,
2006); Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial Exploration, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 411,
436–38 (2006).
77. Knowles & Linn, supra note 36, at 8.
78. William J. McGuire, Inducing Resistance to Persuasion: Some Contemporary Approaches, in
1 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, supra note 66, at 191, 192–96.
79. There are numerous reasons why people are motivated to resist being persuaded, including
but certainly not limited to: (1) the information conflicts with one’s strongly held beliefs or attitudes;
(2) one senses that another person is trying to trick him or her; or (3) others are attempting to lie or
use a tactic in a manipulative fashion, such as when they use flattery as a manipulative attempt to
achieve ulterior goals. Sagarin et al., supra note 76, at 528.

Reilly_22 (D. Barca) (Do Not Delete)

May 2013]

5/24/2013 3:53 PM

COUNTER-OFFENSIVE TACTICS IN LEGAL PERSUASION
80

1189
81

argument as being key elements involved in influence and change.
Specifically, if a person has little motivation and no (or few)
counterarguments to a persuasion message, then that person can
oftentimes be persuaded. But if the targeted person’s motivation could
be increased, and if counterarguments could be made available, then the
influence could be successfully resisted.
One practical application of this dynamic process is called
“inoculation theory,” which is a technique to strengthen resistance to
82
persuasion. The theory draws a comparison between the human body’s
mechanisms to ward off disease and the brain’s mechanisms to defend
itself against potentially persuasive messages. Just as introducing a
weakened form of an attacking virus into the human body will stimulate
antibodies, so too will exposing a person to a weak dose of opposition
83
arguments stimulate the production of counterarguments. Thus,
inoculation theory works exactly like a flu shot: Resistance to persuasion
can be induced by exposing individuals to a small dose of arguments
against a particular idea, coupled with appropriate criticism of those
arguments. As one scholar writes, “by motivating receivers, and then
preemptively refuting one or more potential counterarguments,
inoculation spreads a broad blanket of protection both against specific
counterarguments raised in refutational preemption and against those
84
counterarguments not raised.”
Inoculation theory is quite common in the world of politics.
Politicians are able to anticipate attacks from their opponents, and
sometimes preempt those attacks through the use of inoculation
85
techniques. For example, in the 2008 election, Barack Obama used the
technique in trying to build voter resistance to Republican opponent
John McCain. Specifically, the Obama campaign wanted to “inoculate”

80. See Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Rhetorics of Negotiations 9–10 (Univ. of Iowa Coll. of Law,
Working Paper, 2005) (“Argument is the providing of reasons, grounds, justifications or explanations
either in support of, or in opposition to, some claim or position. The reasons invoked may be factual (‘all
men are mortal’), logical (‘that doesn’t follow’) or normative (‘that’s not fair’). Arguments may be
deductive, inductive or—as is most frequently the case—merely a statement of reasons. They may be
formal or informal; linear or non-linear; fully stated or resting on grounds that are merely implied. . . .
They may be dispassionate, objective and civil—or loud, emotional and highly personal. Narrowly
rational or purely emotional, pleasant or unpleasant, constructive or destructive, cooperative or
competitive, collegial or combative. They may be motivated by good reasons or by bad—by the desire to
find the truth or to reach agreement or by the desire to secure advantage, to dominate, or even to
humiliate one’s adversary. They may be logically, factually and ethically sound . . . [but they don’t] cease
being arguments if they are not.”).
81. McGuire, supra note 78.
82. Id. at 200–02.
83. Michael Pfau, The Inoculation Model of Resistance to Influence, in Progress in
Communication Sciences 133, 137–38 (George A. Barnett & Franklin J. Boster eds., 1997).
84. Id.
85. See generally Michael Pfau & Henry C. Kenski, Attack Politics: Strategy and Defense (1990).
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the voters so they would be “resistant” and not assign weight to
86
McCain’s significant foreign affairs experience.
First, Obama acknowledged McCain’s service to his country:
Now let there be no doubt. The Republican nominee, John McCain,
has worn the uniform of our country with bravery and distinction, and
for that we owe him our gratitude and respect. And we’ll also hear
about those occasions when he’s broken87 with his party as evidence that
he can deliver the change that we need.

Obama then set forth the counterargument:
But the record’s clear: John McCain has voted with George Bush
90 percent of the time. Senator McCain likes to talk about judgment,
but, really, what does it say about your judgment when you think
George Bush was right more than 90 percent of the time? I don’t know
88
about you, but I’m not ready to take a 10 percent change on change.

While it can be debated how effectively the technique was employed
in this particular instance, it was clearly employed: Voters were exposed to
a small dose of arguments building up McCain’s foreign affairs experience,
immediately followed by criticism of those very arguments. Surely Obama
and his team were hoping this “inoculation” would spread a broad blanket
of protection against both specific and general arguments trumpeting
McCain’s foreign affairs experience as superior to Obama’s own.
D. The Approach-Avoidance Conflict Model, Alpha-Omega
Persuasion Strategies, and Cialdini’s Six “Weapons” of
Influence
Kurt Lewin tells the story of a child at the beach whose toy floats in
89
the surf at the water’s edge. The child runs toward the ocean to retrieve
the toy. But as he gets closer, the large splashing waves scare him away.
He stops five or six steps away from the toy and is stuck in that position.
If he backs away, his desire for the toy would impel him to move
forward. If he steps closer to the water, the danger of the waves would
force him to move back. At this point (the point of “equilibrium”), the
90
little boy is stuck between “approach” and “avoidance.”
John Dollard and Neal Miller formalized Lewin’s description into a
91
more formal theory, the approach-avoidance conflict model. More
recently, two scholars of persuasion, Knowles and Linn, have applied the
92
model to the topic of resistance and persuasion. They focus on what they

86. Perloff, supra note 69, at 132.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Kurt Lewin, Frontiers in Group Dynamics, in Field Theory in Social Science: Selected
Theoretical Papers by Kurt Lewin 188, 188–237 (D. Cartwright ed., 1951).
90. Id.
91. See generally John Dollard & Neal Miller, Personality and Psychotherapy (1950).
92. Eric S. Knowles & Jay A. Linn, Approach-Avoidance Model of Persuasion: Alpha and Omega
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believe to be a primary implication of the model—that there are two
fundamentally different ways to create change, two different strategies for
93
promoting movement toward a goal: (1) so-called “Alpha” strategies,
which “promote change by activating the approach forces, thereby
94
increasing the motivation to move toward the goal,” and (2) so-called
95
“Omega” strategies, which “promote change by minimizing the
avoidance forces, thereby reducing the motivation to move away from the
96
goal.”
A prolific and influential investigator of both Alpha and Omega
persuasion strategies is Cialdini, who is credited with organizing a large
body of scholarship into six general categories, or tools of influence and
97
persuasion—tools that Cialdini refers to as “weapons of influence.” The
“weapons” are discussed at length in his book Influence: The Psychology
of Persuasion. Cialdini’s work has had an extensive impact on how
scholars conduct, analyze, and apply research in the area of persuasion;
moreover, within the context of negotiation, the tools provide powerful
insight into how one can effectively (1) lower the negotiation defenses of
other people, (2) overcome resistance to interpersonal persuasion, and
(3) bring about the give-and-take necessary for achieving agreements
acceptable to all parties involved. Following is a brief summary of the six
tools of influence and persuasion.

Strategies for Change, in Resistance and Persuasion, supra note 36, at 117, 119–20.
93. The Alpha strategies include the following: (1) making messages more persuasive (create strong
arguments that justify and compel action); (2) adding incentives (add extra inducements for compliance,
including interpersonal ones such as being liked for an opinion or choice); (3) increasing source credibility
(make the source more expert or attractive to increase his or her persuasiveness); (4) providing consensus
information (show that many people are doing it, thinking it, or wanting it); (5) emphasizing scarcity (tell
the target that few exist, and only for a short time; scarcity makes the opportunity seem more attractive);
(6) engaging the norm of reciprocity (small, gratuitous favors obligate the recipient to reciprocate);
(7) emphasizing consistency and commitment (create small actions or reframe the target’s prior actions to
appear consistent with the requested behavior). Knowles & Linn, supra note 92, at 120.
94. Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
95. The Omega strategies include the following: (1) sidestepping resistance (redefine the interaction
with the persuasion target as not involving influence, e.g., it’s merely a “consultancy” or “conversation”);
(2) addressing resistance directly (address sources of reluctance by lowering costs, counter-arguing
concerns, or offering guarantees; (3) addressing resistance indirectly (build confidence, esteem, and selfefficacy in the persuasion target to remove reluctance); (4) distracting resistance (distract the persuasion
target’s attention to interfere with her counter-arguing the persuasion message); (5) disrupting resistance
(disrupt complacency to bring attention to the message—like if a panhandler on the street asks passersby
to please give him ‘thirty-seven cents,’ the resulting confusion can lead to much higher compliance rates);
(6) consuming resistance (provide persuasion target with prior opportunities to resist—some argue that
asking the persuasion target repeatedly for a ‘yes’ might eventually lead to a ‘yes’ rather than the usual
‘no’ response); (7) using resistance to promote change (frame a message so that resistance to it promotes
change, e.g., reverse psychology). Id. at 123.
96. Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
97. Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion xii (1993).
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Reciprocation: People Should Give to Others What They Want
to Receive in Return

Through reciprocity, people tend to repay in kind what others have
provided them. Even uninvited favors, gifts, and acts of kindness give
98
people a sense of indebtedness that they feel must be reciprocated. It
works at the smallest and subtlest level of human activity and interaction.
For example, one might find herself smiling at a coworker just because the
coworker smiled first. States one scholar regarding reciprocity: “The rule
was established to promote the development of reciprocal relationships
between individuals so that one person could initiate such a relationship
without the fear of loss. If the rule is to serve that purpose, then, an
99
uninvited first favor must have the ability to create an obligation.”
Charities rely on the rule of reciprocity to improve fundraising results.
When the Disabled American Veterans organization used a traditional
100
fundraising letter to appeal for donations, the yield rate was 18%.
However, when the group started enclosing a very small gift along with the
fundraising letter (personalized, self-adhesive address labels printed with
the recipient’s name and address), the response rate nearly doubled to
101
35%.
Based on the rule of reciprocity, negotiators can attempt to elicit
desired behaviors from other parties by first displaying those behaviors.
Whether it’s a sense of trust, increased openness and cooperation, or a
more pleasant and even-keeled demeanor, negotiators need to first
model the behaviors they want to see from others.
For example, in the book Destructive Emotions: How Can We
102
Overcome Them? A Scientific Dialogue with the Dalai Lama, emotions
researcher Paul Ekman devises an experiment between a Tibetan monk
103
and an “aggressive, rather confrontational” university science professor.
Ekman observes the monk and the professor speak to each other for

98. It isn’t always positive acts that are reciprocated. There are instances of negative acts,
emotions, and behaviors that people feel compelled to reciprocate as well. See, e.g., Michelson
Responds to Williams’ “I Don’t Particularly Like the Guy” Comment, ESPN (Dec. 15, 2008), http://
sports.espn.go.com/golf/news/story?id=3770488 (“Steve Williams drew the ire of the world’s thirdranked golfer when, during an event in New Zealand, he said, ‘I wouldn’t call Mickelson a great
player, ‘cause I hate the [expletive],’ according to The Guardian newspaper of Britain. In a next-day
interview with another newspaper, the New Zealand-based Star Times, Williams also said, ‘I don’t
particularly like the guy. He pays me no respect at all and hence I don’t pay him any respect. It’s no
secret we don’t get along either.’” (emphasis added)).
99. Cialdini, supra note 97, at 30.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Daniel Goleman, Destructive Emotions: How Can We Overcome Them? A Scientific
Dialogue with the Dalai Lama (2003).
103. Id. at 17–18.
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fifteen minutes on a topic about which there was strong disagreement
104
(specifically, whether one should abandon science and become a monk).
As predicted, the aggressive professor starts the conversation with
high emotional arousal. However, over the course of the fifteen minutes,
the professor’s arousal begins to slowly dissipate. At the conclusion of the
brief conversation, the professor states: “I couldn’t be confrontational. I
was always met with reason and smiles; it’s overwhelming. I felt
105
something—like a shadow or an aura—and I couldn’t be aggressive.”
It’s unclear if this outcome was an example of “emotional contagion”
106
(that is, where the monk’s emotions spread like a cold to the professor),
or if it was a result dictated by the rule of reciprocity (that is, where the
monk was being reasonable and smiling toward the professor, so the
professor felt compelled to return the same behavior in kind). Whatever
the answer, it appears that people initially displaying aggressiveness can
wind up transforming their own behavior and demeanor to align more with
that of the person with whom they are interacting (which, in this case, was
open, cooperative, and friendly).
The rule is also applicable to litigation matters. In addition to
bargaining over the substantive matters of a case, lawyers who are
preparing for litigation have to negotiate numerous logistical matters (e.g.,
discovery and deposition schedules). Because of the rule of reciprocity, if
one side’s attorneys make concessions on logistical matters, that could
result in similar concessions being made by the other side.
2.

Commitment and Consistency: People Tend to Remain
Committed to Positions and Consistent in Their Behaviors

The commitment and consistency rule suggests that once people
take a stand or go “on the record” in favor of a particular position or
stance, they generally adhere to that position or stance. Cialdini discusses
a study in which researchers ask half the residents of a large apartment
complex to sign a petition supporting the building of a recreation center
107
for people with disabilities. Among those who are asked, agreement to
108
sign is nearly 100%. (Remember, half the residents are never even
109
approached to sign the petition. )
Two weeks later, all residents of the complex are approached and
110
asked to make a donation for such a center. Among those who were
104. Id. at 17.
105. Id. at 18.
106. David R. Caruso et al., Emotional Intelligence and Emotional Leadership, in Multiple
Intelligences and Leadership 55, 64 (Ronald E. Riggio et al. eds., 2002).
107. Robert B. Cialdini, Harnessing the Science of Persuasion, Harv. Bus. Rev., Oct. 2001, at 72,
76–77.
108. Id. at 76.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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never asked to sign the petition, just over 50% make a donation to the
project. However, among those who did sign the petition, donation rate
111
rises to 92%.
Cialdini suggests that the residents who signed the petition felt
112
obligated to live up to their commitment. Cialdini adds that the
obligation was actually increased because the commitments were active
(meaning they were spoken out loud or written down or otherwise made
explicit in an active way), public (meaning they were made known to
other people verbally, through writing, or through other forms of
communication such as photographs, etc.), and voluntary (meaning they
were made under one’s free will rather than through force, coercion, or
113
imposition from some outside source or party).
If a negotiator makes an active, public, voluntary commitment to
something, (e.g., a set of principles, a criterion of fairness, an objective
114
115
standard, a reservation or aspiration point, or the best alternative
116
option to making a deal ), the commitment and consistency rule suggests
it will thereafter be difficult for her to change views on that particular
117
matter.
Consider the summer 2011 negotiation that took place in Congress
regarding raising the debt ceiling. Many members of Congress signed a
118
“no new tax” pledge sponsored by Americans for Tax Reform. Signing
the pledge is another example of an active, public, voluntary commitment;
it ties the signatory parties’ hands to a certain extent, making it difficult for
them to engage in back-and-forth bargaining behavior where concessions
can be traded in the course of hammering out a final agreement.
Or consider a personal injury lawyer who tells a client that he will be
able to secure $200,000 to settle a particular matter out of court. If the
lawyer acted too hastily in arriving at the $200,000 figure and soon
determines the settlement value to be no more than $100,000, he might
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 76–77.
114. Objective standards are outside, independent, third party experts or information sources that can
help determine the value or worth of a deal component within a negotiation in a more objective fashion.
For example, the objective standard used in valuing a used car might be the Kelley Blue Book. See
Richard Birke & Craig R. Fox, Psychological Principles in Negotiating Civil Settlements, 4 Harv. Negot.
L. Rev. 1, 13 (1999).
115. In a negotiation, the reservation point is one’s “bottom line,” or the maximum amount that a
buyer will pay (or minimum amount the seller will accept) for a good, service, or other legal
entitlement. The aspiration point is just the opposite: It is the best deal one could possibly hope to
achieve or obtain through the negotiation process. See Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal
Negotiation, 88 Geo. L.J. 1789, 1791–94 (2000).
116. Fisher et al., supra note 4, at 100 (“[BATNA] is the standard against which any proposed
agreement should be measured. That is the only standard which can protect you both from accepting
terms that are too unfavorable and from rejecting terms it would be in your interest to accept.”).
117. See Sagarin & Wood, supra note 25, at 323.
118. William G. Gale & Brennan Kelly, The ‘No New Taxes’ Pledge, 104 Tax Notes 197, 200 (2004).
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be so embarrassed by the initial public commitment to $200,000 that he
cannot bring himself to encourage his client to accept a generous
settlement offer of $125,000.
Or consider union versus management negotiations where,
hypothetically, the union representative publicly declares he “won’t agree
to any deal that doesn’t include 100% health care benefits.” Because the
commitment is made publicly, it is difficult for the union representative to
make any change whatsoever on that particular negotiation point (even if
new information suggests that a change in position might be better, overall,
for the union membership). Thus, making a public commitment during a
negotiation can lead to decreased flexibility in a process where
compromise, concessions, and trades can sometimes result in overall
superior agreements for everyone at the table.
Consider yet another kind of negotiation: jury members negotiating
with each other on whether a particular criminal defendant is innocent or
guilty. In American criminal cases, the jury must reach a unanimous
decision in order to convict or acquit the accused. If the jury cannot
reach a unanimous decision, the case ends in a mistrial or “hung jury,”
and the costly trial process might begin anew.
During deliberations, jury members tend to periodically poll the jury
119
members for a vote count on defendant guilt versus innocence. This
120
polling can take place either by “show of hands” or by secret ballot.
Based on the effects of public commitment, two scholars predicted that
juries that used the “show of hands” polling procedure would be less likely
121
to reach a unanimous verdict than juries who used secret ballots. They
predicted that once a juror has committed publicly to a position (by
visibly raising a hand or not raising a hand), then she will be resistant to
122
changing that vote.
123
The researchers created eighty-nine mock juries. Each jury read
several case summaries and then tried to reach a unanimous verdict in
each of the cases. Half the juries used only “show of hands” voting
124
during deliberation; the other half used only secret ballots.
The researchers found that when the cases were relatively clear-cut
and most jurors could quickly agree on a particular verdict, then the “show
of hands” and secret ballot voting procedures produced equivalent
125
numbers of hung juries. However, when cases were not as clear-cut—
when they were a “close call”—it was found that “show of hands” jury
119. See Nobert L. Kerr & Robert J. MacCoun, The Effects of Jury Size and Polling Method on the
Process and Product of Jury Deliberation, 48 J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 349, 349–52 (1985).
120. Id. at 351.
121. Id. at 349–52.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 352.
124. Id. at 352–53.
125. Id. at 361.
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voting caused significantly more hung juries than did voting by secret
126
ballot. As the researchers explain, “[b]eing publicly identified with a
position may force early commitment to that position and make it difficult
127
to change one’s position without appearing inconsistent or irresolute.”
The lesson for persuasion in the context of negotiation is to create
an environment where parties can feel free to come to the bargaining
table with an open mind and without having made (or having to make)
public commitments to a particular position or set of goals. With any
luck, conversations leading up to the negotiation itself can set forth the
general ground rule that parties will be open to talking about and
seriously considering numerous possible options and package deals to
satisfy various underlying interests of the involved parties, and thus
parties will not issue any sort of statements or press releases with
ultimatums or with unyielding commitments to certain positions within
or certain outcomes for the negotiation. This can be difficult because the
stereotype of hard positional bargainers is to rally support from their
constituents by telling them exactly what they, the negotiators, will
demand during the negotiation, what they will not accept, and that they
will not yield until the final outcome of the negotiation conforms
squarely with the various “take it or leave it” demands that were made.
It might also be agreed that the negotiation will take place in private
with the press and outsiders excluded from the proceedings. This might
not be possible in certain cases (for example, where so-called “open
meeting” laws have been enacted to ensure public access to certain kinds
of negotiation forums). However, in many instances, negotiating in private
can make it easier for the parties to really listen to the views, arguments,
and positions of all the parties involved, rather than feeling pressure to
“play to the gallery” of constituents attending the negotiation—that is,
showing how “tough” and stubborn one can be by exhibiting a largely
unfriendly, unyielding, take-it-or-leave-it negotiation stance toward the
other parties.
Finally, if a party to the negotiation does make public commitments,
it is important for other parties in the negotiation to provide face-saving
reasons (such as reasons why circumstances have changed) that allow the
commitment-making party to gracefully back down from those
128
commitments should they wish to do so. As President John F. Kennedy
stated in a speech at American University soon after the Cuban Missile
Crisis: “Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear
powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to the
129
choice of either a humiliating defeat or a nuclear war.”
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Birke & Fox, supra note 114, at 53.
Kevin Hillstrom, The Cold War 270 (2006).
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Or rather than potential nuclear threats, consider a more mundane
matter involving commerce, such as a seller who states the familiar,
“There is no way we can lower our price—this is our final offer.” If it
later becomes clear that the price must be lowered to complete the sale,
the other side needs to find a way to help the seller save face. Examples
of such a statement include: (1) “I am glad I was able to find ways to
compensate you for a lower price because I know you could not have
lowered it otherwise,” or (2) “I realize that you are doing me a favor by
reducing the price beyond what is normally possible, and I greatly
130
appreciate it.”
3.

Social Proof: People Tend to Follow the Lead of Other People—
Especially People Who Are Similar to Oneself

The principle of social proof suggests that, in many situations,
people look to others to determine how to behave. This is one of the
reasons why “laugh tracks” on television comedy shows are so
131
effective—people laugh because others are laughing.
Moreover, there is an important caveat to the general rule: Studies
suggest that people are more likely to follow the examples of others
whom they perceive to be similar to themselves in various ways—such as
age, occupation, cultural or ethnic background, political or religious
beliefs, socioeconomic status, educational attainment, sports-watching,
hobby, travel, or exercise interests, professional accomplishment, or state
132
or region of birth or residence. Thus when trying to influence others in
a negotiation—especially people who tend to be resistant to influence
and persuasion—it will be more effective if the people or examples relied
upon for “social proof” are similar to the people being targeted for
influence. In one experiment, for example, residents of New York City
133
were asked to return a lost wallet to its owner. While people were
highly likely to return the wallet when they learned that another New
Yorker had previously attempted to do so, learning that someone from a

130. Deepak Malhotra & Max H. Bazerman, Negotiation Genius: How to Overcome
Obstacles and Achieve Brilliant Results at the Bargaining Table and Beyond 278 (2007).
131. Raymond G.C. Fuller & Alan Sheehy-Skeffington, Effects of Group Laughter on Responses
to Humorous Material, A Replication and Extension, 35 Psychol. Rep. 531, 533 (1974).
132. See Harvey A. Hornstein et al., Influence of a Model’s Feeling About His Behavior and His
Relevance as a Comparison Other on Observers’ Helping Behavior, 10 J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 222, 225
(1968); see also Paul J. Silvia, Deflecting Reactance: The Role of Similarity in Increasing Compliance and
Reducing Resistance, 27 Basic Appl. Soc. Psychol. 277, 278 (2005) (“Similarity increases the positive
force toward compliance by increasing liking. Attraction to the communicator is a well-known force
toward compliance. Liking another person increases the tendency to like objects that the other person
likes. Similarity also enhances the communicator’s credibility, which further increases the force toward
compliance.” (citations omitted)).
133. Cialdini, supra note 107, at 72–76.

Reilly_22 (D. Barca) (Do Not Delete)

1198

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

5/24/2013 3:53 PM

[Vol. 64:1171

foreign country had tried to return the wallet had no impact on their
134
decision one way or the other.
4.

Liking: People Tend to Say Yes to People They Know and Like

At Tupperware parties, one person hosts a party for friends to
demonstrate (and try to sell) Tupperware products. Studies have shown
that the strength of the friendship bond between the seller and buyer is
twice as likely to determine the sale as is a preference for the product
135
itself. And while some attendees of the party might not mind the
“liking and friendship” element of the experience, others clearly do. As
one person states regarding invitations to such parties:
It’s gotten to the point now where I hate to be invited to Tupperware
parties. I’ve got all the containers I need; and if I wanted any more, I
could buy another brand cheaper in the store. But when a friend calls
up, I feel like I have to go. And when I get there, I feel like I have to
136
buy something. What can I do? It’s for one of my friends.

Research indicates that numerous factors can promote liking between
137
two people; some of these factors include: physical attractiveness,
138
similarity (e.g., in opinions, personality traits, background, lifestyle,
139
exhibiting cooperative
dress, or interests), giving compliments,
140
141
behavior, and familiarity. It is not a surprise, then, that investigators
134. Id.; see Gary Goodpaster, A Primer on Competitive Bargaining, 1996 J. Disp. Resol. 325, 373
(1996) (“A negotiator should make a practice of asking the other party to justify its positions in terms of
some objective criteria.”). The fact is that negotiators will oftentimes turn to “objective criteria” (or
outside, independent, third party experts or information sources—such as the Kelley Blue Book value of a
car—that can help determine the fair value or true worth of a particular deal component) as a tool of
persuasion during a negotiation. Social proof is similar in that it, too, relies upon external factors and
elements to add legitimacy, credibility, and persuasive force to various deal terms, options, and proposals
that are being considered during the negotiation process. See generally Robert H. Mnookin et al.,
Beyond Winning: Negotiating to Create Value in Deals and Disputes (2000); Madan M. Pillutla & J.
Keith Murnighan, Fairness in Bargaining, 16 Soc. Just. Res. 241 (2003).
135. Cialdini, supra note 97, at 168.
136. Id. at 168–69.
137. Research has shown that people automatically assign numerous favorable traits to highly
attractive people, including talent, kindness, honesty, and intelligence. In a study of federal political
candidates in Canada, it was found that physically attractive candidates received 2.5 times as many
votes as less attractive candidates. In a study involving defendants in a criminal justice system, it was
found that physically attractive defendants were twice as likely to avoid jail as the unattractive ones.
Still other studies demonstrated that physically attractive people are better liked, more persuasive, and
more frequently helped when they need assistance. Id. at 171–72.
138. Silvia, supra note 132, at 278.
139. Indeed, compliments seem to be such a powerful tool of liking and persuasion that research
suggests that positive comments produce liking for the flatterer even when they are untrue. States
Professor Robert Cialdini, “We are phenomenal suckers for flattery. Although there are limits to our
gullibility—especially when we can be sure that the flatterer is trying to manipulate us—we tend, as a
rule, to believe praise and to like those who provide it, oftentimes when it is clearly false.” Cialdini,
supra note 97, at 175.
140. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 190 (1984) (“We are used to thinking
about competitions in which there is only one winner, competitions such as football or chess. But the
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determine those who tend to be cooperative (rather than competitive)
during a negotiation are rated as more effective, on average, than those
142
who are not.
5.

Scarcity: Items and Opportunities Are Seen to Be More Valuable
as They Become Less Available

According to reactance theory, discussed above, people experience a
negative emotional reaction when they believe someone else is threatening
to eliminate their freedom (such as their choices in life or their range of
alternatives). This might take the form of supply limits (“buy while
supplies last”), time limits (“this is a limited time offer”), or competition
(“if you don’t purchase my house this morning, someone scheduled to look
at it this afternoon will surely buy it and you’ll miss out”).
143
In framing offers, negotiators should remember that potential
losses can be much more persuasive than potential gains. The power of
“loss language” was demonstrated in a study involving a group of

world is rarely like that. In a vast range of situations mutual cooperation can be better for both sides than
mutual defection. The key to doing well lies not in overcoming others, but in eliciting their cooperation.”).
141. See Charles Craver, Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement 65–72 (7th ed. 2012)
(discussing the “Preliminary Stage” of negotiation).
142. See Gerald R. Williams, Legal Negotiation and Settlement 19 (1983); Andrea Kupfer
Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style,
7 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 143, 164–65 (2002). Both of these scholars add valuable insights to an
important, ongoing debate. In related research, leading economists have argued that both cooperation
and honesty tend to promote long-term relationships and success in negotiation. See Axelrod, supra
note 140, at 190. See generally Robert H. Frank, Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of
Emotions (1988); Max H. Bazerman & Margaret A. Neale, The Role of Fairness Considerations and
Relationships in a Judgmental Perspective of Negotiation, in Barriers to Conflict Resolution 86
(Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
143. When a persuader builds an effective “frame” in order to present information from a
particular angle or point of view, it can cause dramatic shifts in how the information is received by a
listener. Consider, for example, when some politicians and policy advocates changed the frame of the
“estate tax” by calling it the “death tax.” While Professor George Lakoff has argued the term “death
tax” is a neologism used as a propaganda tactic to aid in efforts to repeal estate taxes, author and
Republican party pollster Frank Luntz suggests the new frame was an effective, strategic, and morally
sound way to garner public support for eliminating the tax. Says Luntz:
The public wouldn’t support it because the word ‘estate’ sounds wealthy. Someone like me
comes around and realizes that it’s not an estate tax, it’s a death tax, because you’re taxed at
death. And suddenly something that isn’t viable achieves the support of 75 percent of the
American people. It’s the same tax, but nobody really knows what an estate is. But they
certainly know what it means to be taxed when you die. I argue that is a clarification; that’s not
an obfuscation.
Frontline, The Persuaders: Frank Luntz http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/persuaders/
interviews/luntz.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2013). See generally George Lakoff, Don’t Think of an
Elephant!: Know Your Values and Frame the Debate (2004); Frank Luntz, Words That Work: It’s
Not What You Say—It’s What People Hear (2007). For an excellent article on six techniques of the
Socratic Method and their application in conflict reframing, see John W. Cooley, A Classical Approach to
Mediation—Part II: The Socratic Method and Conflict Reframing in Mediation, 19 U. Dayton L. Rev. 589
(1994).
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144

California home owners. Half were told that if they fully insulated their
homes, they would save a certain amount of money each day. The other
half were told that if they failed to insulate, they would lose that same
145
amount of money each day. In the end, significantly more people
146
insulated their homes when exposed to the loss language.
Similar outcomes have occurred in health research. In one study, for
example, pamphlets urging women to check for breast cancer through selfexaminations are significantly more effective if the pamphlet uses “loss
language” (such as, “You can lose several potential health benefits by
failing to spend only five minutes each month doing breast selfexamination”) rather than “gain language” (such as, “You can gain several
potential health benefits by spending only five minutes each month doing
147
breast self-examination”).
In framing offers, negotiators should also keep in mind that exclusive
information can be more persuasive than widely available data. For
example, in one study, wholesale beef buyers more than doubled their
orders when they were told that, due to poor weather conditions in foreign
countries from where cattle was imported, there would likely be a scarcity
148
of foreign beef in the near future. But the orders increased by a
whopping 600% when the beef buyers were told that no one else had that
149
information yet. As Cialdini states, “Apparently the fact that the news
carrying the scarcity of information was itself scarce made it especially
150
persuasive.”
6.

Authority: People Tend to Be Persuaded by Experts

Modern life has become extraordinarily complex. For this reason,
there are many areas (such as law, finance, medicine, and technology)
where specialized knowledge from authorities and experts is required to
answer even fairly basic questions that arise in the given area.
The authority principle states that people who are experts or who
are in positions of authority tend to have influence over the way others
think and behave. Perhaps the best known illustration of the principle is
the work of Stanley Milgram, who did some groundbreaking studies on
151
authority in the early 1960s. Milgram discovered that (1) if the person

144. Cialdini, supra note 107, at 72, 78.
145. Id.
146. See id.; see also Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive
Perspective, in Barriers to Conflict Resolution, supra note 142, at 44, 54.
147. Cialdini, supra note 97, at 239.
148. Id. at 255.
149. Id. at 255–56.
150. Id. at 256.
151. See Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. Abnormal & Soc. Psychol. 371
(1963); Stanley Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, 18 Hum. Rel. 57
(1965).
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running a psychological experiment wears a simple white lab coat (to
many, a sign of authority), and (2) if that person repeats (in a professional
and monotone tone of voice), the instruction, “The experiment requires
that you go on” to volunteers who are controlling the extent to which
others will be subjected to electric shocks, then (3) the vast majority of
people placed in that situation will continuously apply increased doses of
152
electric shocks to supposedly suffering human subjects. As Milgram
states in the postscript to one of his articles:
With numbing regularity good people were seen to knuckle under the
demands of authority and perform actions that were callous and
severe. Men who are in everyday life responsible and decent were
seduced by the trappings of authority, by the control of their
perceptions, and by the uncritical acceptance of the experimenter’s
153
definition of the situation, into performing harsh acts.

If negotiators wish to use their own specialized knowledge to
influence how matters will be considered and addressed during the
process, the negotiators must first make their expertise known to the other
parties involved. This information can be (1) stated verbally toward the
beginning of the negotiation process (perhaps by telling anecdotes about
successfully solving matters similar to the one on the agenda, or by
discussing one’s advanced training, fellowships, or apprenticeships in the
area involved); (2) placed in a résumé or CV that is read by all the
parties; or (3) communicated through the display of awards, certificates,
and diplomas that are visible throughout the office or negotiation area.
In some circumstances, negotiation parties will simply be ignored if
they do not “toot their horn” with respect to their authority, training,
knowledge, or expertise. In one study, physical therapy professionals
were frustrated because so many of their stroke patients abandoned their
154
prescribed exercise routines soon after leaving the hospital. Upon
interviewing the patients, it became clear they were simply not aware of
the education and training required to become a physical therapist, and
therefore the exercise advice tended to be largely discounted and
155
ignored. The solution? The director of the unit put on display the

152. Anders Kaye, Does Situationist Psychology Have Radical Implications for Criminal
Responsibility?, 59 Ala. L. Rev. 611, 619–20 (2008). Fully 65% of the people placed in the situation
administered shocks until they reached the maximum limit on the dial (450 volts). Thus, they continued to
administer shocks well after complaints of pain (120 volts), complaints of heart trouble and demands to be
let go (150 volts), shouts of “I can’t stand the pain!” (180 volts), screams of agony (270 volts), hysterical
screams combined with complaints of heart trouble (330 volts), and, finally, complete silence (345 volts).
Indeed, people were told that silence should be interpreted as a wrong answer, causing many people to
continue administering the shocks after the period of silence began. The experiment was repeated
numerous times with large numbers of subjects, but the results remained very consistent. Id. at 619.
153. Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to Authority, supra note 151, at 74.
154. Cialdini, supra note 107, at 75–77.
155. Id.
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awards, diplomas, and certifications of all staff therapists, resulting in a
156
34% increase in exercise compliance.

III. Persuasion Strategies and Techniques (and Resisting Them)
Nearly all of the persuasion strategies discussed in this Article fall
within either the “Alpha” or the “Omega” categories discussed above—
that is, they either increase one’s motivation to approach or move toward
the goal or deal, or they decrease one’s motivation to avoid or move
away from the goal or deal. In order to recognize, and then resist or
defend against, persuasion tactics and strategies being used by other
parties, readers can ask themselves the following question throughout a
negotiation:
Is what the other party is doing or saying at this instant merely a tactic
or strategy of persuasion? More specifically, is there anything about
their words or behaviors that makes me more likely to move toward or
accept a given deal (or deal point) than I otherwise would? Or,
alternatively, is there anything about their words or behaviors that
makes me less likely to move away from or reject a given deal (or deal
point) than I otherwise would?

Following is a list of mindsets, strategies, and techniques—many of
them based on empirical research—that can be employed to influence
and persuade others during a negotiation. Most of these are fairly subtle
actions and behaviors; they are not “hard ball” tactics (such as “good guy,
157
158
159
bad guy,” “take it or leave it,” “anger and threats,” and “limited
160
authority” ) that have been described and analyzed in previous writings

156. Id. at 77.
157. See Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with Power
Differentials in Negotiations, 5 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1, 94–95 (2000). The “good guy, bad guy” routine
is a variation of the “good cop, bad cop” interrogation tactic used in cop shows such as CSI, where the
first interrogator (or “bad cop”) threatens to bully and even physically beat the prisoner into
confession or submission. The second interrogator (the “good cop”) interferes with a much softer
approach, causing the prisoner to work cooperatively with the “good cop.” In a commercial situation,
the “bad guy” will adopt a very competitive and uncompromising position, along the lines of: “We
won’t pay one cent more than $3.85 per unit.” The “good guy” can then interject with a softer,
seemingly more reasonable approach: “This company has been a great supplier to us for years. Surely
we can pay $4.05 per unit.” At that point, the salesperson might leap at the $4.05 offer, even though
the “good guy, bad guy” team had authority to spend much more. Note that sometimes a “good guy”
will talk about an imaginary “bad guy” that is “back at the office” or somewhere else.
158. Id. at 97.
159. People who favor this persuasion technique tend to believe it will invariably result in their
counterparts relenting and yielding to the bullying demands (i.e., they will “accommodate”). That,
however, is not always the case. Research suggests some people will “fight fire with fire” by yelling
and bullying right back (i.e., they will “compete”), which can lead to escalation and impasse. Still other
people will leave the situation immediately in order to escape the confrontation all together (i.e., they
will “avoid”). See Mnookin et al., supra note 134, at 51–56.
160. Consider the person who negotiates long and hard for the purchase of a new car, only to be told
by the salesperson: “Now I have to take this deal to my manager for approval.” The outcome is usually
the same: The manager says to the clerk, “No, you’ve given away too much,” leading to another round of
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161

about negotiation. Nor are they tactics that “seek in some fashion, with
varying degrees of dishonesty, to mislead or disorient unprepared
negotiators into one-sided agreements” in favor of the person using the
162
tactic. Finally, they are not tactics used by “unprincipled” negotiators
163
trying to “take advantage” of other people. Nevertheless, they are
powerful techniques that can influence how other people think and
behave during a negotiation. In short, they are effective tools of
influence and persuasion. Furthermore, negotiators who are not aware
that these techniques exist—and who cannot recognize them and resist
them—are placing themselves (and their clients) at a clear disadvantage
with respect to negotiation outcomes and final settlement results.
The tactics and techniques are organized into four categories:
(1) making offers (that is, when they should be made and how people
might respond to them), (2) organizational tactics (the processes and
mechanics of how issues will be structured and considered during a
negotiation, such as whether there will be a written agenda, or whether an
auction will be used as part of the negotiation process), (3) communication
techniques (the issues surrounding particular communication vehicles used
during a negotiation, such as email, texting, or face-to-face), and
(4) psychological techniques (issues such as mood, emotions, and conflict,
and how they play a role in one’s ability to think, analyze, and respond
within the context of a negotiation).
While the persuasion theory discussed earlier in this Article will
help readers understand how or why a given tactic or technique can be
effective, a major takeaway from this Article will, I hope, be for readers
to learn to recognize and shield themselves against the various tactics
(i.e., to resist persuasion attempts made by others), even if those same
negotiations and concessions. To resist or defend against this tactic, one must ask the other party whether
they have full authority to settle, and he or she must do this before the negotiation process begins. Make it
clear that you need to know all the people or offices that need to review and ultimately approve the deal,
as well as anyone or any office that has the power to veto or derail a deal that has been agreed upon.
161. See Craver, supra note 141, at 254–306; Mnookin et al., supra note 134, at 211–23;
G. Richard Shell, Bargaining for Advantage: Negotiation Strategies for Reasonable People
228–33 (2006); Adler & Silverstein, supra note 157, at 93–102; Michael Meltsner & Philip Schrag,
Negotiating Tactics for Legal Services Lawyers, in What’s Fair: Ethics for Negotiators 205, 205–11
(Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael Wheeler eds., 2004); see also Fisher et al., supra note 4, at 129;
Goodpaster, supra note 134, at 349–64 (listing commonly used hard-ball ploys and tactics, including “lowballing,” “nibbling,” the “salami,” “Boulwarism,” “good guy, bad guy,” the “red herring,” and others).
162. Adler & Silverstein, supra note 157, at 102.
163. As Fisher et al. stated in Getting to Yes:
There are many tactics and tricks people can use to try to take advantage of you. Everyone
knows some of them. They range from lies and psychological abuse to various forms of
pressure tactics. They may be illegal, unethical, or simply unpleasant. Their purpose is to help
the user ‘win’ some substantive gain in an unprincipled contest of will. Such tactics may be
called tricky bargaining.
Fisher et al., supra note 4, at 129. See generally Jonathan R. Cohen, When People Are the Means:
Negotiating with Respect, 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 739 (2001).
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readers decide for ethical or other reasons not to use the tactics as
164
negotiation swords (i.e., to influence and persuade others). And even
though the tactics tend to be less obvious, less aggressive, and less well
known than various negotiation “tricks” and hardball “ploys,” they are by
no means less effective when employed toward the goals of influence and
persuasion. By being able to recognize and respond to the techniques,
negotiators can resist their powers and nullify their impacts.
A. Making Offers
1.

Presenting Choices in the Distant (Rather than Near) Future

Nira Liberman and Yaacov Trope suggest that the value of an event
changes depending upon whether it is in the distant future or the near
165
future. According to their Temporal Construal Theory, distant-future
situations are construed at a “higher level” than are near-future
166
situations. In other words: People tend to focus on the general and
abstract features of events that are in the distant future, but they tend to
167
focus on the specific and concrete features of events in the near future.
For example, consider a university professor who receives an
invitation to present his or her research at an academic conference in the
future. According to Temporal Construal Theory, if the conference is
nine months down the road, the professor, in making the decision
whether or not to attend, will tend to focus on the higher-level general
and abstract elements of the conference, such as the general lure of the
conference host city (think San Francisco . . .), the excitement of the local
tourist attractions and restaurants, and even the value of what might be
learned at the conference itself.
However, if the conference were to begin in a mere ten days, the
professor, in making the decision whether or not to attend, will tend to
focus on the lower-level specific and concrete elements involved, such as
cost, the difficulty and inconvenience of travel, and logistical matters like
168
making overnight kennel arrangements for the family pets.
Thus if the matter being negotiated is an activity that will take place
in the distant future, then paramount in the parties’ minds will be the
higher-level general and abstract elements of the activity: Is it desirable? Is
it moral? Is it in line with my personal or professional goals, values, and
164. See Friestad & Wright, supra note 5, at 3.
165. Nira Liberman & Yaacov Trope, The Role of Feasibility and Desirability Considerations in Near
and Distant Future Decisions: A Test of Temporal Construal Theory, 75 J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 5, 5–18
(1998).
166. Id. at 6–7.
167. Id. See generally Michael D. Sagristano et al., Time-Dependent Gambling: Odds Now, Money
Later, 131 J. Experimental Psychol. 364 (2002).
168. Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Temporal Construal and Time-Dependent Changes in
Preference, 79 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 876, 887 (2000).
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priorities? On the other hand, if the matter being negotiated is activity that
will take place in the near future, then paramount in the parties’ minds will
be the lower-level specific and concrete elements of the activity: Is it
169
feasible? Does it fit into my schedule? Does it fit into my budget?
The implications of this theory upon resistance to persuasion in
negotiation are very real: The investigators of the theory suggest that time
constraints make up some of the lower-level specific and concrete elements
of a given activity. This means that people tend to give little weight to time
constraints when they are planning for the distant future, and will
sometimes agree, during a negotiation, to accept more time-consuming
responsibilities and burdensome activities if those responsibilities and
170
activities will be occurring in the distant future.
For example, a supervisor at a car manufacturing plant approaches a
worker and says, “Starting in six months from now, would you agree to
spearhead the production of our new car model in return for a 100% pay
raise?” The worker might accept the offer, even though he is aware the
new job responsibilities will require working eighty hours per week
rather than his current forty, including many nights and weekends. The
Temporal Construal Theory suggests that if the supervisor had made the
same offer starting next week rather than six months down the road, the
worker would be more likely to reject the offer.
Resistance Strategy: Before agreeing to a particular deal any part of
which is going to take place in the distant future, it is crucial that one give
careful thought to exactly how he or she would assess those same deal terms
if they were going to take place in the immediate future. In the example
from above, where a worker is asked if he wants to lead the production of
a new car model starting six months down the road, the worker must ask
himself: “How would I respond to this offer if my new role were to start
tomorrow rather than six months from now?” By asking this question, the
worker is more likely to think of the specific and concrete elements of his
current life (such as the joys of playing golf in the evenings or coaching
Little League on the weekends) that would be impacted by having to work
the additional hours, and his response to the offer might be different.
Thus, negotiators who do not understand the implications of the
Temporal Construal Theory might be persuaded to agree to deal terms
they might reject out of hand if (1) the negotiation were taking place closer
to the actual occurrence of the event in question, or (2) if they could
successfully anticipate how they would assess those same deal terms as the
171
event draws near or is about to start.

169. Liberman & Trope, supra note 165, at 11.
170. Trope & Liberman, supra note 168, at 877.
171. Liberman & Trope, supra note 165, at 11.
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Offering Multiple Choices

If one expects resistance during the problem-solving phase of a
negotiation, one strategy is to offer one’s counterpart a choice among
several possible alternatives. The motivation and ability to resist can then
be satisfied through the alternatives that are rejected, even though one of
172
the alternatives is ultimately accepted. Two scholars suggest that giving
173
a choice between just two different alternatives is sufficient.
For example, if a child is resistant to doing his or her homework, the
parent might sit down with the child and ask, “Okay, do you want to start
with math first, or would you prefer to start with history?” Such a choice is
sometimes referred to as an “alternative-choice double-bind” because
while the child does indeed get to make a selection between two possible
alternatives, both alternatives bind the child to the same outcome: starting
174
on the homework.
Of course, there are some who might suggest that using the
alternative-choice double-bind technique borders on being manipulative
and that while it might work on a child in the case of doing homework, it
could lead an adult to resist all the alternatives being offered. Indeed,
one of the investigators of the technique reported that when the strategy
is employed for “personal advantage,” it consistently leads to “bad
175
results.” However, when it is used for “the other person’s benefit,”
176
then there can be lasting benefit. This conclusion appears to support
the admonition by Roger Fisher that negotiators need to see themselves
as problem-solving “colleagues (with somewhat differing interests) trying
177
to work out a good solution to a difficult problem.” Fisher suggests that
such an orientation can prevent parties from engaging in coercive tactics
178
that tend to damage relationships.
Resistance Strategy: Be wary of any negotiator who presents a
number of alternatives along with some sort of “binding” technique. It is
fine to respond that none of the suggested alternatives is acceptable, and
then to present a list of one’s own alternatives.

172. See E.T. Higgins, Promotion and Prevention as a Motivational Duality: Implications for
Evaluative Processes, in Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology 503, 503–25 (S. Chaiken & Y.
Trope eds., 1999).
173. M.H. Erickson & E.L. Rossi, Varieties of Double Bind, 17 Am. J. Clinical Hypnosis 143
(1975); see Charles B. Craver, Effective Legal Negotiation and Settlement (6th ed. 2009) (discussing
“multiple equal offers”).
174. Erickson & Rossi, supra note 173, at 143.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 144.
177. Roger Fisher & Scott Brown, Getting Together: Building A Relationship That Gets to
Yes 141 (1988).
178. Id. For thoughtful discussions on the art of choosing, as well as the difficulties that can be
presented from having too many choices, see Sheena Iyengar, The Art of Choosing (2010); Chris
Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora’s Box?: The Costs of Options in Negotiation, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 601 (2003).
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Asking the Offering Party: “Is That Your Best Offer?”

Some people look at negotiation as a tug-of-war process whereby
parties initially set forth extreme offers and demands and then give back179
and-forth concessions until the parties settle somewhere in the middle.
For an individual who negotiates in such a fashion, a truthful answer to
the question “Is that your best offer?” would be something along the
lines of, “Of course it’s not my best offer. The game is for me to start at
one extreme, you to start at the other, and by the end of the process we
will settle somewhere in the middle—hopefully closer to my extreme
180
than to yours.” But rarely, if ever, would such truthful words be uttered
during a negotiation.
Others believe that making extreme initial offers in a negotiation and
then proceeding to dance together toward the middle of those extreme
offers amounts to little more than game playing, and they would rather
make one reasonable and fair offer or demand at the beginning of the
process, and settle at or very close to that point. For that person, a truthful
answer to the question “Is that your best offer?” might be something like,
“Of course it’s my best offer. I’m not here to try to play games and hide
the ball. I threw out an offer that I think is fair and reasonable to all sides,
181
and I’m not about to change it just because you asked that question.”
Resistance Strategy: Even though the two approaches to negotiation
mentioned above are substantially different, the “defense” to the question
“Is that your best offer?” can be the same in either case. The defense is to
explain why the offer is fair and reasonable—more specifically, why the
benefits and attributes of the product or service do in fact justify the offer
that was initially put forth. Objective standards and criteria can be used
whenever possible, but other principles such as equity, equality, and need
182
can inform the negotiation as well. Other parties might disagree and
continue to fight for concessions or for what they consider to be a more
reasonable offer; nonetheless, the initial response to the question “Is that
179. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 754, 767 (1984) (“The literature of negotiation presents a stylized
linear ritual of struggle—planned concessions after high first offers, leading to a compromise point
along a linear field of pre-established ‘commitment and resistance’ points. In such legal negotiations
the compromise settlement point is legitimized by comparing it to the polarized demands of plaintiff
and defendant . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
180. See id. (“[T]he final outcome . . . will be at the ‘focal point’ midway between the first offers of
each party.”).
181. For a thoughtful discussion of extreme first offers and possible responses, see Bruce Barry &
Raymond A. Friedman, Bargainer Characteristics in Distributive and Integrative Negotiation, 74 J.
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 345, 347 (1998).
182. For a more thorough discussion of what is just and reasonable, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Introduction to What’s Fair: Ethics for Negotiators xxxi (Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Michael
Wheeler eds., 2004) (questioning the extent to which the justice of negotiated outcomes can be
measured by principles such as equity, equality, need, social welfare, precedential value, likelihood of
enforcement, and effects on others).
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your best offer?” should be to try to defend the offer as just and
183
reasonable.
4.

Providing a Guarantee

Providing a guarantee, such as a money-back guarantee on a product
or service, directly addresses resistance by removing fears involved in
184
buying the product or service. If the product doesn’t work, doesn’t fit, or
has any number of other problems, it can be returned for a full refund. The
Nordstrom department store is well known for its unconditional guarantee
185
and “no questions asked” return policy. In fact, one of the store’s return
stories long circulated in the press (even though scholars claim the story is
actually a myth) is the customer who allegedly returned a set of tire chains,
186
even though Nordstrom sells neither tires nor chains. According to the
myth, the employee followed the store’s liberal return policy and provided
187
the customer with a refund.
A guarantee is an effective way to address any sort of ambivalence.
When negotiating, people anticipate potential negative consequences of
all kinds. For example, a couple engaged to be married might be resistant
to rent a particular wedding reception area because it is outdoors and it
might rain or the weather might be cold on the planned wedding day.
The guarantee would state that if it rains, tents will be provided, and if
it’s cold, the tents will be pumped with warm air, or the reception will be
moved to a beautiful space inside. Thus, the guarantee makes the
proposal more desirable by removing various sources of ambivalence and
reluctance, and thereby overcoming a central source of resistance.
Resistance Strategy: Guarantees are put into place to address
resistance by removing fears. It is important to make sure that the
guarantee is specific and addresses all potential fears. For example, a
general guarantee such as, “We will do whatever we have to do to make
your wedding reception a success,” is not specific enough. The guarantee
has to be thorough and comprehensive by addressing the various disasters
and contingencies that might occur: What is the guarantee if it is too cold
outside for people to stand in the garden? What if it rains? What if the
building burns down or there is a flood? And if the guarantee is that the
wedding date can be moved to a different day with nice weather, then who
gets to decide the new date? And is the courtyard already booked for any
183. See generally Cecilia Albin, The Role of Fairness in Negotiation, 9 Negot. J. 223 (1993).
184. See, e.g., David Gabel, Deregulation: Should the Local Telephone Market Be Next?, 24 New
Eng. L. Rev. 39, 51 n.49 (1989) (“By signing long-term contracts with customers prior to beginning
construction, an entrant would reduce its risk. The contracts could provide a guarantee that there will
be sufficient business to cover the [entrant’s] sunk costs.”).
185. David Solnet & Jay Kandampully, How Some Service Firms Have Become Part of “Service
Excellence” Folklore: An Exploratory Study, 18 Managing Service Quality 179, 186 (2008).
186. Id.
187. Id.
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other date that the couple might want? In summary, it is important that if
guarantees are going to effectively remove fears, those guarantees should
be as comprehensive and specific as possible, with the consenting party
having as much power and control over the guarantee as possible.
Guarantees can also take the form of a contingent contract. For
example, if a sports hero is confident his playing in a game will lead to a
sell-out stadium of 80,000 people, but the promoter is convinced that no
more than 20,000 tickets will be sold, then a contingency agreement can be
formed where the athlete is paid in direct proportion to the number of
seats sold. Such a guarantee allows the player to reap large salary rewards
if ticket sales are high, while simultaneously allowing the promoter to
escape the risk of paying a high, “sell-out” type salary if far fewer seats end
up being sold.
B. Organizational Tactics
1.

Trying to Cherry-Pick the Elements of a Deal

Some parties will attempt to lock in specific elements of a deal as the
negotiation progresses, rather than considering all the elements together as
a group. So the party might say, “Before we get to anything else, I want to
nail down the price.” Or they might say, “I accept a, b, and c of your offer,
but I reject x, y, and z.”
Resistance strategy: While one can agree “in principle” to various
elements of the deal, it must be stressed from the outset that no single
element is agreed upon until all elements have been agreed upon (i.e.,
188
“nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”). In the first example
above, one might respond, “We can agree in principle on a price, but of
course that is subject to change after we consider all the other elements of
this deal, including warranties and service agreements.” In the second
example from above, one might respond, “I had linked a, b, c, x, y, and z as
a group, so if you are only interested in a, b, and c, then we’ll have to think
about a new price for that more limited package.” Linking the various
issues from the outset, and getting them all out on the negotiation table,
simply prevents other parties from treating the negotiation like a buffet
where they attempt to select (and limit the negotiation to) only the items
189
they want.
188. See Kent Conrad, Chairman, U.S. Senate Budget Comm., Senate and House Conferees on the
FY 2010 Budget Resolution (Apr. 27, 2009), available at http://budget.senate.gov/democratic/
index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=7a9d0d9d-e8bb-44db-a67d-ea12d5fac117 (“I want to make clear that while
it has been reported in the press that there is a framework agreement, and there is, we also have an
understanding that nothing is decided until everything is, and everything is not yet decided. So that is the
posture we’re in.”).
189. See, e.g., Owen Lippert, One Trip to the Dentist Is Enough: Reasons to Strengthen Intellectual
Property Rights Through the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 9 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent.
L. J. 241, 277–78 (1998) (“Canada, the United States, and Mexico would have just cause to deny new
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Summarizing What Has Been Discussed so Far

Negotiators periodically summarize the progress of the negotiation
to ensure that all parties have a similar sense of what has been heretofore
agreed upon. The technique can be particularly useful during an impasse,
both to provide a reprieve, as well as to remind parties that progress has
190
been made, and therefore additional progress is possible.
Summarizing the negotiation’s progress can be used to focus the
negotiation on certain issues and topics, downplay other topics, or
altogether avoid still other topics. The summarizing process is therefore a
chance to exert power and control during the negotiation, and to
influence and persuade regarding what will (or will not) continue to be
191
negotiated, as well as how it will (or will not) continue be negotiated.
Resistance Strategy: All parties must listen carefully during the
summarizing process to make sure information is presented completely
and accurately, especially regarding the more controversial aspects of the
negotiation. One should not hesitate to correct the person conducting the
summary, nor to interject information, nor to give a slightly different
interpretation of matters or events being considered.
3.

Arriving with a Written Agenda for the Negotiation

Arriving at a negotiation with a written agenda—preferably one that
can be passed out to the other parties—can be highly advantageous
because it can dictate the topics of discussion, the order in which they will
192
be discussed, and the time allotted for each topic. It can also include
ground rules for communication procedures between parties and with the
outside world, for example, (1) disallowing personal attacks, foul language,
or interruptions to others who are speaking during the negotiation,
(2) determining, in the context of a multi-party negotiation, whether two
or more parties can briefly leave the negotiation room to have private
conversations with each other—possibly building voting blocs or making
side deals—before returning to negotiate with the larger group,
(3) dictating the timing and duration of meals and other breaks, or
(4) establishing issues of process surrounding the use of press conferences
193
to report on progress or deadlocks.
signatories the complete tariff benefits of an expanded NAFTA if they got to ‘cherry pick’ which
NAFTA obligations they would adopt. NAFTA was signed as a package deal and was only possible
because of its all-or-nothing structure of negotiations. Each country weighed the trade-offs in NAFTA,
then signed the agreement because as a whole it promised a net benefit.” (footnote omitted)).
190. See generally Thomas M. Tripp & Harris Sondak, An Evaluation of Dependent Variables in
Experimental Negotiation Studies: Impasse Rates and Pareto Efficiency, 51 Organizational Behav. &
Hum. Decision Processes 273 (1992).
191. See generally Lawrence E. Susskind et al., Parallel Informal Negotiation: A New Kind of
International Dialogue, 12 Negot. J. 19 (1996).
192. Albin, supra note 183, at 225–28.
193. Id.

Reilly_22 (D. Barca) (Do Not Delete)

May 2013]

5/24/2013 3:53 PM

COUNTER-OFFENSIVE TACTICS IN LEGAL PERSUASION

1211

Resistance Strategy: Parties should prepare their own agendas and
have them copied for distribution at the negotiation. Parties can elect to
adopt one particular agenda, or they can negotiate a compromise among
the various agendas submitted.
4.

Injecting Competition into the Negotiation

In 1990, Ryoei Sato, a Japanese businessman, paid almost $83 million
194
for van Gogh’s “Portrait of Dr. Cachet” at an international art auction.
This was twice the price that was expected to be received for the painting,
195
as estimated by Christie’s auction house. Sato had, it appears, fallen
victim to what psychologists call the winner’s curse: when one discovers he
or she has “won” the negotiation, but likely paid too much in doing so.
An auction is a situation that artfully injects competition into the
negotiation process. Consider what happened in 1973, when ABC
television agreed to pay $3.3 million for a single television showing of the
196
movie The Poseidon Adventure. The figure “greatly exceeded the
highest price ever paid previously for a one-time movie showing” (which
197
was $2 million for the movie Patton). In fact, the payment was so
excessive that ABC thought it would lose $1 million on the Poseidon
198
showing. So how did the price escalate to such heights? It was likely
due to the fact that it was the first time that a motion picture had been
offered to the three networks (ABC, NBC, and CBS) in an open-bid
199
auction. The President of CBS describes the auction thusly:
We were very rational at the start. We priced the movie out, in
terms of what it could bring in for us, then allowed a certain value on
top of that for exploitation.
But then the bidding started. ABC opened with two million. I came
back with two point four. ABC went to two point eight. And the fever of
the thing caught us. Like a guy who had lost his mind, I kept bidding.
Finally, I went to three point two; and there came a moment when I said
to myself, “Good grief, if I get it, what the heck am I going to do with
200
it?” When ABC finally topped me, my main feeling was relief.

Auctions can take place in many contexts—not just when a business
or a painting is placed “on the block” to be sold. Consider the “reverse
auction,” where I want to install a new swimming pool in my back yard. I
acquire three different bids for the job. When the bids arrive, I notice
they are all slightly different in terms of materials being used, date of
194. $82.5 Million Price for Portrait by van Gogh Brushes Aside Auction Record, Milwaukee
Sentinel, May 16, 1990, at 1.
195. Id.; see Anthony J. Del Piano, The Fine Art of Forgery, Theft, and Fraud: Corruption in the
World of Art and Antiquities, 8 Crim. Just. 16 (1994).
196. Cialdini, supra note 97, at 264.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 265.
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completion, warranties offered, etc. I then invite all three bidders to my
home office where they will compete against each other in a “reverse
201
auction.”
I am able to selectively quote from each of the three bids, stressing
aspects where their rival bidders have presented me with more favorable
terms or conditions. If I am effective, I can probably get the bidders to
slowly bid the price of the job downward or the quality of the product
upward. The “reverse auction” works to my advantage because it increases
the competitive process for the various rival bidders that hope to get my
202
business.
Resistance Strategy: Be on the lookout for when competition has
been injected into the conversation. This might be done by (1) limiting
the available supply of a good or service or (2) increasing the number of
people bidding for or otherwise competing for those goods or services.
More specifically, the winner’s curse can thrive in conditions (such as
auctions) where there are numerous competitors for a limited supply,
and where there is great uncertainty regarding the price of the items or
services under consideration. In the particular case of auctions, one can
research items being auctioned (e.g., What are comparable items worth?
What price has this item fetched in previous auctions? Are there people,
events, or circumstances that are helping to increase prices for this
particular auction, or at this particular time?) and, based upon that
research, one can set upper limits to what will be paid.
As for reverse auctions specifically, if one is given an offer to “rebid” a job, do not re-bid it. If you decide to re-bid, do so only once, and
inform the “reverse auction” leader that you will only submit a single rebid. Support your presentation with as many experts and objective criteria
as can be found in order to underscore that your bid is reasonable and fair,
even in the eyes of trained experts who are not party to the negotiation (or
to making a profit through the negotiation) and who are therefore unlikely
to be biased in their assessment.
C. Communication Techniques
1.

Calling Another Party Unexpectedly by Telephone to Negotiate

Catching another party “off guard” by calling them unexpectedly on
the telephone to negotiate can be a tremendous advantage in terms of
persuasion. When caught unprepared to discuss a given matter, parties

201. See generally Takayuki Suyama & Makoto Yokoo, Strategy/False-Name Proof Protocols for
Combinatorial Multi-Attribute Procurement Auction (Columbia Univ., Working Paper, 2004)
(discussing a “reverse auction” situation where the buyer is in effect the “auctioneer” and the sellers
are in effect the “bidders,” who proceed to bid the price to lower and lower levels).
202. See generally Guhan Subramanian, Negotiations: New Dealmaking Strategies for a
Competitive Marketplace (2010).

Reilly_22 (D. Barca) (Do Not Delete)

May 2013]

5/24/2013 3:53 PM

COUNTER-OFFENSIVE TACTICS IN LEGAL PERSUASION

1213

will sometimes nonetheless attempt to “wing it” and engage in a
conversation, thereby disclosing valuable information (about the case,
203
about negotiation or litigation strategy, etc.).
Resistance Strategy: If parties are not completely ready to negotiate,
they should arrange a time for the telephoning party to call back at a later
time for the negotiation. If the party is fully prepared, then he or she can
proceed with the phone conversation, paying careful attention to clues
from caller’s voice (tone, pitch, etc.) and choice of words. A party should
be careful to not interrupt other parties, as well as to employ the strategic
use of silence, both of which can lead to increased information disclosures.
2.

Using Email to Alter Information or Communication Flow, Style,
and Cues

In terms of persuasion, email can allow a party to exhibit a
personality that is completely different from her own. For example, one
whose personality is normally very friendly and accommodating can send
emails that exhibit a more abrupt, confrontational, and competitive style of
negotiation. Likewise, one whose personality is normally more abrasive
and competitive can present an email with a sweet and friendly
204
demeanor.
Negotiating by email also gives the parties time to think about offers
and other information being presented and to react to that information in
their own time—away from pressures that can be associated with the
205
immediate responses expected in face-to-face negotiations.
In essence, negotiating through email changes the dynamic of
communication in ways that can be strategically beneficial or detrimental,
depending on the situation and depending on whether a person is trying to
withhold information, or shape how that information is presented. For
example, some people find it difficult to say “no” when they are face-toface, but have no difficulty doing so by email. Others might find they are
prevented from asking follow-up questions over email that they could
206
easily ask (and demand answers to) in a face-to-face conversation.
Finally, using email can allow one to be extremely careful regarding
what information will be conveyed (e.g., whether it will be more detailed
and complete, or whether it will be more opaque and vague), how it will
be conveyed (e.g., what words, phrases, stories, or analogies will be used,
and how the information will be organized, framed, emphasized, or

203. See Craver, supra note 141, at 203–04; see also Herb Cohen, You Can Negotiate Anything
209–15 (1980).
204. See generally Michael Morris et al., Schmooze or Lose: Social Friction and Lubrication in EMail Negotiations, 6 Group Dynamics: Theory, Res. & Prac. 89 (2002).
205. See Craver, supra note 141, at 204–06.
206. Id.
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slanted), and when it will be conveyed (e.g., in drabs and pieces over
time, all together in one long message, or something in between).
Resistance Strategy: Suggest that you would rather resolve the issue
in a face-to-face conversation, preferably in person. If it is not possible to
meet in person, then through a technology such as video chat that will
allow parties to communicate verbally as well as through facial
expressions and body language, and all in “real time.” If that is not
possible, suggest a conversation by telephone. Try very hard to avoid
technologies such as texting, instant messaging, and emailing where
words and punctuation marks are the only means of communication.
3.

Communicating Face-to-Face, or at Least by Telephone

In groundbreaking research conducted by Albert Mehrabian, it was
determined that 55% of a person’s communicated message is conveyed
through body posture, gestures, and facial expressions; 38% is through
one’s voice (tone, pitch, pace, etc.); and only 7% is through the words
207
themselves. This means that the most thorough and effective way to
communicate information to another person is through face-to-face
communication; the next best way is over the telephone so at least the
voice can be heard; and the worst way is through any text-only device
(such as emailing, texting, or instant messaging) where only words are
used to convey the message.
Not surprisingly, Mehrabian’s research also suggests that people who
communicate using words alone are more likely to come to an impasse
208
during negotiation. Indeed, Leigh L. Thompson, author of The Mind and
Heart of the Negotiator, states that “people are more cooperative when
209
interacting face-to-face than via other forms of communication.” She
adds that in negotiations without personal, face-to-face contact, “things do
not move very well, and relationships between people are often strained
210
and contentious.”

207. Paul Ekman et al., Relative Importance of Face, Body, and Speech in Judgments of Personality
and Affect, 38 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 270, 270–77 (1980); John W. Kennish, How to Read Body
Language: Non-Verbal Cues Can Turn into Clues That Help Lead You to the Truth, 17 Pa. Law. 28, 28–31
(1995); Laurie Shanks, Whose Story Is It, Anyway? Guiding Students to Client-Centered Interviewing
Through Storytelling, 14 Clinical L. Rev. 509, 525 (2008) (discussing the role body language, including
“mannerism, gesture, [and] tone,” can play in conveying information). See generally Paul Ekman,
Emotions Revealed: Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve Communication and Emotional
Life (2004).
208. Philippe Gilliéron, From Face-to-Face to Screen-to-Screen: Real Hope or True Fallacy?,
23 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 301, 338 (2008) (“All in all, experiments tend to show that [computermediated-communications] creates less consensus, and thus leads to more impasses than [face-to-face].
Rapport seems to be the key, since the rate of agreements clearly increases when there is
personalization or a feeling of belonging to the same group.” (footnote omitted)).
209. Leigh Thompson, The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator 273 (2d ed. 2000).
210. Id.
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One communication scholar suggests that the “human moment,”
which he describes as an encounter between people requiring “physical
presence and their emotional and intellectual attention,” has started to
211
disappear completely from modern life. This instructor of psychiatry at
Harvard Medical School discusses the various advantages of the “human
moment” as follows:
[P]ositive human-to-human contact reduces the blood levels of the
stress hormones epinephrine, norepinephrine, and cortisol.
Nature also equips us with hormones that promote trust and bonding:
oxytocin and vasopressin. . . . [T]hese hormones are always present to
some degree in all of us, but they rise when we feel empathy for another
212
person—in particular when we are meeting with someone face-to-face.

Research also suggests that these bonding hormones are at
suppressed levels when people are physically separate, which could be one
reason why it is easier (and more likely) for a person to deal harshly with
213
another person through email than when talking face-to-face.
Furthermore, scientists hypothesize that face-to-face conversations
stimulate two crucial neurotransmitters: dopamine, which enhances both
pleasure and attention, and serotonin, which reduces both worry and
214
fear.
The implications of this research are clear and profound: If people
negotiate face-to-face, they are more likely to trust each other, to build
215
rapport and bond with each other, and to feel empathy toward each
216
other. This increases the chances that people will actually like each
other, which Cialdini has forcefully argued plays a dramatic role in their
217
ability to influence and persuade each other.
Resistance Strategy: While some might suggest that engaging in
negotiation behaviors that increase the likelihood for the generation of
trust, rapport, and empathy is always a positive development, there might
be instances when a negotiator wants to avoid their generation. For
211. Edward M. Hallowell, The Human Moment at Work, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.–Feb. 1999, at 58, 59.
212. Id. at 63. See generally Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Deeply Contacting the Inner World of Another:
Practicing Empathy in Values-Based Negotiation Role Plays, 39 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y 189 (2012).
213. Hallowell, supra note 211, at 63.
214. Id.
215. The most effective behaviors for building and maintaining rapport during negotiation include
facing the other party directly, leaning forward, keeping arms open instead of crossed, smiling,
nodding, having good but not overbearing eye contact, and sharing personal and shared interests in
order to develop a greater sense of connection. John W. Cooley, Mediation Advocacy 167 (2d ed.
2002); Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists:
Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 437, 503 (2008).
216. See Habib Chamoun & Randy Hazlett, The Psychology of Giving and Its Effect on Negotiation,
in Rethinking Negotiation Teaching: Innovations for Context and Culture 151, 152 (Christopher
Honeyman et al. eds., 2009) (“Mutual empathy opens channels of cooperativeness and willingness to
explore different options, enhancing the creativity of the parties and the willingness to listen to what
either party has to say in a negotiation.”).
217. See Cialdini, supra note 97, at 167–207.
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example, consider the negotiator who wishes, for whatever personal or
professional reasons, to remain absolutely separated and distant from the
other negotiation party in absolutely every respect—physically,
emotionally, psychologically, etc.—and therefore does not want to develop
or continue any kind of bond or ties or relationship with that other party.
One such case might be a daughter who was sexually molested by
her father, and she is negotiating a financial settlement with the father as
part of a civil lawsuit in the case. In such a case, it would be easier to
maintain distance and separation between the two parties if they did not
communicate face to face. Instead, the parties might choose to hire an
218
agent to negotiate on their behalf, or, if they wanted to be more
directly involved in the negotiations, they could do so through email,
instant messaging, or texting.
D. Psychological Techniques
1.

Starting with Small Requests That Can Open the Door for Larger
Requests

Salespeople are taught that they are more likely to obtain a large
sale by starting with a small one. The purpose of the small transaction is
not profit; rather, it is commitment. As stated in the trade magazine
American Salesman:
The general idea is to pave the way for full-line distribution by starting
with a small order . . . . Look at it this way—when a person has signed
an order for your merchandise, even though the profit is so small it
hardly compensates for the time and effort of making the call, he is no
219
longer a prospect—he is a customer.

Thus by starting with a small sale or a small request and achieving
success or agreement, it is easier to make larger and larger sales and
requests. Two academics provide a classic example of this technique,
often called the “foot-in-the-door” technique. In the study, researchers
asked homeowners if they would place a very large public service
220
billboard on their lawns that read, “Drive Carefully.” Only 17% of
221
households agreed to placement of the huge billboard.
In the second phase of the experiment, a different group of
homeowners is asked to display a very small, three-square-inch sign that
reads, “Be A Safe Driver,” near their homes, and nearly everyone agrees

218. See generally Negotiating on Behalf of Others: Advice to Lawyers, Business Executives,
Sports Agents, Diplomats, Politicians, and Everybody Else (Robert H. Mnookin & Lawrence E.
Susskind eds., 1999).
219. Francis Greene, The “Foot-in-the-Door” Technique, Am. Salesman, Dec. 1965, at 14, 14.
220. Jonathan L. Freedman & Scott C. Fraser, Compliance Without Pressure: The Foot-in-theDoor Technique, 4 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 195, 199–202 (1966).
221. Id. at 200–01.
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222

to the request. But two weeks later, those same homeowners are
approached again and asked if they will now place the massive “Drive
223
Carefully” public service billboard on their lawns. Compliance rises
224
dramatically to 76%. The study illustrates the technique perfectly: A
small request made initially raises very little resistance, and agreement to
the small request provides the gateway for larger and more dramatic
225
requests and changes down the road.
Researchers suggest that the “foot-in-the-door” technique works
because there is a change in self-perception that occurs when a person
226
carries out the initial request. Specifically, once people agree to the
initial request, they begin to see themselves differently; their attitudes
start to change, and suddenly they see themselves as the kind of people
227
who agree to certain kinds of requests.
Similarly, negotiating smaller, less controversial issues at the
beginning of a negotiation can serve to build momentum and lead to
positive feelings between the negotiating parties. Investing time and
energy while working together, even to solve easy matters upon which
there is little or no disagreement, nevertheless works to build rapport and
strengthen relationship bonds. The hope is that this strong foundation will
increase the likelihood that the more difficult and controversial deal
228
points can then be successfully tackled and agreed upon.
Resistance Strategy: Be mindful that agreeing to very small requests
made by others can lead to larger and larger requests. Consider stating
up front something like, “Yes, I can accommodate this small request, but
unfortunately that is all I will be able to do.” In addition, consider being
explicit about putting the most difficult issue(s) of the negotiation up
front and center. Other parties might put up some resistance to such a
plan, but remain resolute and explain that you do not want to waste time
and energy settling a number of easy issues if, in the end, the most
difficult issues cannot be successfully addressed. A powerful supporting

222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.; see Cialdini supra note 97.
225. One scholar says the foot-in-the-door technique is similar to a “bobble-head” effect: Once the
message recipients start nodding “yes,” it’s likely they will continue to nod “yes.” Stanchi, supra note
76, at 418–19. See David Crump, The Social Psychology of Evil: Can the Law Prevent Groups from
Making Good People Go Bad?, 2008 BYU L. Rev. 1441, 1447 (2008) (pointing out that the “foot-inthe-door” technique can also be used for more violent and sinister purposes: “[P]olitical regimes that
use torture would be able to recruit torturers by small steps: first, by having newcomers stand guard,
then by having them observe, and then by inducing minor participation.”).
226. Daniel O’Keefe, Persuasion: Theory and Research 170–71 (1990).
227. Michael Burgoon & Erwin P. Bettinghaus, Persuasive Message Strategies, in Persuasion: New
Directions in Theory and Research 144, 156 (Michael E. Roloff & Gerald R. Miller eds., 1980).
228. See Hon. Myron S. Greenberg & Megan A. Blazina, What Mediators Need to Know About
Class Actions: A Basic Primer, 27 Hamline L. Rev. 191, 223 (2004) (discussing how it can be beneficial
to start with small issues before tackling larger issues to help establish momentum in negotiations).
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argument is that the smaller, yet-to-be-decided issues can then be used as
trades and concessions during the rest of the negotiation.
2.

Using the Powers of Emotional Contagion

Research consistently shows that groups of negotiators in a positive
mood obtain significantly larger “joint gains” than do negotiators either
229
in a neutral or negative mood. Researchers have also found that people
negotiating in a positive mood behave less competitively, are more
willing to use integrative strategies, and tend to formulate more
230
optimistic, cooperative, and integrative action plans. Moreover, it
seems to require very little time and effort to put people in a sufficiently
better mood that leads to better results: One group watched a funny
231
232
video, and another group read funny comics and received a small gift.
Interestingly, investigators find that the mood of one set of
negotiators matters even if those with whom they negotiate are in a
different mood. Thus, even when those in a more positive mood negotiate
with those who are in a more negative mood, the ones in the more positive
233
mood are still likely to do better. The research indicates that positive
mood increases “cognitive flexibility” and improves “creative problem
234
solving across a broad range of settings.” It also influences the way
people make judgments, remember, and process social information—

229. See Keith G. Allred et al., The Influence of Anger and Compassion on Negotiation
Performance, 70 Org. Behav. & Hum. Dec. Proc. 175 (1997); Peter J.D. Carnevale & Alice M. Isen,
The Influence of Positive Affect and Visual Access on the Discovery of Integrative Solutions in Bilateral
Negotiation, 37 Org. Behav. & Hum. Dec. Proc. 1, 2 (1986); Roderick Kramer et al., Self-Enhancement
Biases and Negotiator Judgment: Effects of Self-esteem and Mood, 56 Org. Behav. & Hum. Dec. Proc.
110, 116–17 (1993). Note that while there is not much evidence regarding how mood affects individual
(as opposed to joint) gains, Professor Clark Freshman suggests that this lack of evidence might result
merely from the “ideologies of negotiation scholars.” States Freshman: “Among leading scholars in
the legal academy . . . there are various ideological tendencies that obscure a focus on the bottom-line
for any given individual. It is as if negotiation scholars aspire to be Brandeisian counselors to the
situation, with benefits to any given individual secondary.” Clark Freshman, The Lawyer-Negotiator as
Mood Scientist: What We Know and Don’t Know About How Mood Relates to Successful Negotiation,
2002 J. Disp. Resol. 1, 15–16 (2002).
230. Joseph P. Forgas, On Being Moody but Influential: The Role of Affect in Social Influence
Strategies, in Social Influence: Direct and Indirect Processes, supra note 71, at 162–63.
231. See Kramer et al., supra note 229.
232. See Carnevale & Isen, supra note 229.
233. Joseph P. Forgas, On Feeling Good and Getting Your Way: Mood Effects on Negotiator
Cognition and Bargaining Strategies, 74 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 565, 569–71 (1998).
234. Alice M. Isen, On the Relationship Between Affect and Creative Problem Solving, in Affect,
Creative Experience, and Psychological Adjustment 3, 3 (Sandra W. Russ ed., 1999). See Jennifer
S. Mueller & Jared R. Curhan, Emotional Intelligence and Counterpart Mood Induction in a
Negotiation, 17 Int’l J. Conflict Mgmt. 110, 112 (2006) (“An impressive body of research has shown
that positive mood and related variables (e.g. liking, satisfaction) play a pivotal role in the
development and maintenance of positive social interaction, such as higher levels of cooperation,
fewer contentious behaviors, more helping behavior, higher levels of organizational spontaneity, and
higher supervisor ratings of performance.” (citations omitted)).
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processes that are “all implicated during the course of a typical
235
negotiation.”
In addition, research suggests that moods are contagious. Within a
negotiation, emotions can spread similar to a fast-spreading disease in a
236
process known as “emotional contagion.” Daniel Goleman, an expert
on emotions and author of the ground-breaking book Emotional
237
Intelligence, concludes that emotions can spread between individuals
“like electricity through wires.” He explains:
The reason . . . lies in what scientists call the open-loop nature of the
brain’s limbic system, our emotional center. A closed-loop system is
self-regulating, whereas an open-loop system depends on external
sources to manage itself. In other words, we rely on connections with
other people to determine our moods. . . .
....
Scientists describe the open loop as “interpersonal limbic
regulation”; one person transmits signals that can alter hormone levels,
cardiovascular functions, sleep rhythms, even immune functions, inside
the body of another. That’s how couples are able to trigger surges of
oxytocin in each other’s brains, creating a pleasant, affectionate
feeling. But in all aspects of social life, our physiologies intermingle.
Our limbic system’s open-loop design lets other people change our
238
very physiology and hence, our emotions.

While starting a negotiation by watching a funny video might be
inappropriate or unprofessional, one should be mindful of the role that
mood can play in achieving superior results for all parties involved.
235. Leigh L. Thompson et al., Some Like It Hot: The Case for the Emotional Negotiator, in Shared
Cognition in Organizations: The Management of Knowledge 141 (Leigh Thompson et al. eds., 1999).
236. Caruso et al., supra note 106, at 64.
237. Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence (1995). See John D. Mayer et al., Emotional
Intelligence, in Handbook of Intelligence 396 (Robert J. Sternberg ed., 2000). Goleman’s initial
approach to emotional intelligence included five components: knowing one’s emotions, managing
emotions, motivating one’s self, recognizing emotions in other people, and handling relationships. Id.
Three years after publishing Emotional Intelligence, Goleman’s ideas were expanded, in Working
with Emotional Intelligence, to include twenty-five competencies grouped into the same five basic
categories (though the labels changed): (1) self-Awareness (emotional awareness, accurate selfassessment, self-confidence); (2) self-Regulation (self-control, trustworthiness, conscientiousness,
adaptability, innovation); (3) motivation (achievement, commitment, initiative, optimism); (4) empathy
(understanding others, developing others, service orientation, diversity, political awareness); and
(5) social Skills (influence, communication, conflict management, leadership, change catalyst, building
bonds, collaboration/cooperation, team capabilities). Daniel Goleman, Working with Emotional
Intelligence (1998). See Caruso et al., supra note 106, at 62.
238. Daniel Goleman et al., Primal Leadership: The Hidden Drive of Great Performance, 79 Harv.
Bus. Rev. 42, 46 (Dec. 2001). The authors report that “scientists have captured the attunement of
emotions in the laboratory by measuring the physiology—such as heart rate—of two people sharing a
good conversation.” As the interaction begins, the bodies of the two people operate at different
rhythms. However, fifteen minutes into the conversation, “the physiological profiles of their bodies
look remarkably similar.” The authors recount studies where even completely nonverbal
expressiveness can affect other people. In one such study, three strangers sat facing one another in
complete silence; after facing each other for just one or two minutes, it was found that the most
emotionally expressive of the three transmitted his or her mood to the other two. Id. at 47.
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Everything in the negotiation environment that might influence the
general mood of the negotiators is relevant: from the physical environment
(including temperature, noise levels, and the physical attractiveness of the
space), to matters such as availability of snack food and beverages,
restroom breaks, and parking availability.
The key finding with respect to persuasion is that being in a good
mood can make a negotiator behave in a more cooperative fashion. In
other words, the negotiator is more inclined to meet the needs of the
other party, whether through making concessions or through agreeing to
239
follow a different plan of action.
Resistance Strategy: The key is to be aware that being in a good
mood during a negotiation (whether that mood existed upon entering the
negotiation or was generated through food or another factor at the
negotiation itself) is something that can impact how cooperative,
agreeable, and giving one might be during the negotiation. One must
therefore always ask the question: Am I agreeing to this deal because it is
fair and reasonable, or am I agreeing to this deal because I happen to be
in a good mood?
3.

Acknowledging the Other Party’s Resistance

While research supporting this proposition is still in its infancy, it
appears that an effective way to turn resistance against itself is to simply
240
acknowledge it.
Intuition suggests that identifying and labeling resistance might give
it power and credence. However, as Knowles and Linn have discovered
through their research: “Acknowledging the resistance, labeling it, and
making its role overt may have the paradoxical effect of defusing its
241
power and rendering that resistance less influential.”
In two separate studies, Knowles and Linn took short statements
such as, “[P]arking at [this university] is easier and cheaper than at most
universities,” followed by a measurement of how much the reader agreed
242
with the statement. Half the readers were given the statement alone;
the other half were given the statement preceded by an acknowledgment
243
of resistance, e.g., “You’re not going to believe this, but . . . .” It turned

239. Forgas, supra note 230, at 162–63.
240. Several scholars have written eloquently on the power of simply acknowledging and “naming”
what a negotiation matter is truly about—warts and all—even when doing so might be uncomfortable
for the speakers and/or listeners. See generally William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, and Claiming, 15 Law & Soc’y Rev. 631 (1980–1981);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory, 1984 Am. B.
Found. Res. J. 905 (1984).
241. Eric S. Knowles & Jay A. Linn, Approach-Avoidance Model of Persuasion: Alpha and Omega
Strategies for Change, in Resistance and Persuasion 138 (Eric S. Knowles & Jay A. Linn eds., 2004).
242. Id. at 138–40.
243. Id. at 139.

Reilly_22 (D. Barca) (Do Not Delete)

May 2013]

5/24/2013 3:53 PM

COUNTER-OFFENSIVE TACTICS IN LEGAL PERSUASION

1221

out that in all the versions where the target’s resistance was acknowledged
before the main point of the statement was made, there were higher
acceptance scores than in the versions that did not first acknowledge
244
resistance.
Knowles and Linn argue that their studies demonstrate that attitude
change can occur without persuasion. In their investigation, there was no
245
persuasive attack or counter-argument directed toward the resistance.
The resistance was merely acknowledged. Their studies also confirm that
acknowledging resistance during a conversation does not empower that
246
resistance; indeed, it appears to defuse it and decrease its potency.
Negotiators, then, can use to their advantage brief statements
acknowledging the target’s resistance. Knowles and Linn showed that in
all of the following examples, quickly acknowledging resistance [found in
brackets] before setting forth the main message of the statement
effectively reduced resistance and increased acceptance:
Dr. Stubblefield, a university physicist, says, “Most people [don’t think
so, but they] have the ability to move objects through mental effort.”
The psychiatric nurse at Charter Vista Hospital says, “[It’s really weird
and sounds bizarre, but] when it is a full moon our psychiatric patients
get crazier than at other times.”
A professor of medicine said recently, “[You’re not going to believe
this, but] within 50 years, the average life expectancy will pass 100
years.”
A Dean of Students at the university says, “[I know you will not want
to agree with this, but] if students paid a little more tuition, they would
get a much better education.”

....
Dr. Stubblefield, a facilities planner for the university, says, “[I know
you will not want to agree with this but] parking at the University of
247
Arkansas is easier and cheaper than at most universities.”

Resistance Strategy: It is very helpful to be aware of the finding that
Party A’s resistance to Party B’s statement can be decreased (and Party
A’s acceptance of the statement correspondingly increased) merely by
Party B’s acknowledgment of Party A’s resistance. This is an instance
248
where the adage “A tactic perceived is no tactic” might be applicable.
In other words, while it does not appear that scholars have tested the
proposition, it makes sense that simply being aware of the finding—or
being aware that said outcome tends to occur under said circumstances—
would render the outcome less likely to occur.

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
Id. at 139–40.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Cohen, supra note 6, at 138.
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Employing the Strategic Use of Silence

One scholar advises that sometimes lawyers and other negotiators
need to stop talking: “Silence can be the best way to get another person
to start talking. This can be hard sometimes—most lawyers are not good
with silence. . . . As any good psychotherapist will tell you, all kinds of
249
feelings may surface in silence.”
Every semester, I do an exercise with my negotiation students to
underscore the power of silence. I have them stand up and, when I give
the signal, they are told to “shake hands hello” and then to wait for my
next instruction. The only rule is that they absolutely cannot talk at all
during the entire course of the exercise, except to say “hello” or “nice to
250
meet you.” After I give the signal, the students all shake hands, say
hello, and wait for the next instruction.
I then don’t say anything for a full sixty seconds.
Consistently, the students grow very uncomfortable during the
exercise. Many of them begin to smirk or laugh uncomfortably, look at
the walls of the classroom, or cast their gaze at the floor or the ceiling. In
several classes, I have had students literally fall to the ground in hysterics
because they are laughing so hard.
In debriefing the exercise, students report how uncomfortable they
felt during the exercise, how they were not able to look the other person in
the eyes during the silence, and that the sixty seconds seemed to go by in
rather painful, slow motion. I explain that they have just felt the power of
silence. It is easy to think about the rule in a theoretical sense; it’s difficult
for students to fully grasp its power until they experience it for themselves.
Resistance Strategy: Effective negotiators must learn to be
comfortable with silence—both on the giving end and the receiving end.
It can be surprising what information is produced (through talking) by
one party when he or she is confronted with another party’s silence.
Silence can lead one to feeling uncomfortable, which in turn can lead to
one’s talking, thereby divulging crucial information to the other side. It
can be argued that “information is the lifeblood of any negotiation” and
that, “at its core, negotiation is about protecting sensitive information of
one’s own (to prevent oneself from being exploited) while extracting
251
information from other parties.” Silence is a potent tool that has the
potential of accomplishing both tasks: Being silent can prevent oneself

249. Abbe Smith, The Lawyer’s “Conscience” and the Limits of Persuasion, 36 Hofstra L. Rev.
479, 493 (2007).
250. One additional “rule” is that students cannot look at the professor during the exercise. Not
being able to look at the professor forces them to look at their counterpart or at their surroundings—
an experience that drives home the point that eye contact combined with silence can quickly lead to
uncomfortable feelings.
251. Peter Reilly, Was Machiavelli Right? Lying in Negotiation and the Art of Defensive Self-Help,
24 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 481, 533–34 (2009).
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from divulging important information, while simultaneously prompting
one’s counterparts to fill the “dead air” with important information that
they might not otherwise divulge.
5.

Pleading, Cajoling, and Hounding

As part of her job, Abbe Smith has to represent (and therefore
negotiate with) poor people accused of serious crimes, including death
penalty matters. Oftentimes, her clients lack experience and expertise in
navigating an incredibly complex (and sometimes unjust) justice system,
so there are instances when scared and headstrong clients will take the
following ill-advised but nonetheless resolute negotiation position: “I
252
ain’t takin’ no plea.”
The advice Smith gives to people representing such clients is
excellent and at times counterintuitive. Her ideas underscore the notion
that selecting tools of persuasion is an art that depends on the history
and context of a situation, as well as the personalities involved. Not all
negotiations take place in pleasant environments with relaxed parties
wearing nice clothing. Some negotiations involve deathly scared clients
sitting in dingy prison holding cells with armed security officers guarding
the door.
Important lessons and insights can be drawn from both contexts, and
I believe Smith’s advice in how to approach persuasion in the context of
253
representing, counseling, and negotiating with these “unpopular clients”
is applicable to all manner of professional experts whose jobs entail doling
out counsel and advice to (sometimes inexperienced, uncompromising, or
just plain wrong) clients in the course of helping those clients navigate
complex business, political, legal, or other waters. To get her clients to
“lower their defenses, and ultimately get them [to] change their
254
minds,” Smith employs the following techniques, which she has learned
over several decades of fighting on the front lines of difficult and hardfought criminal defense legal battles:
255
First, lawyers can and should “pester and hock and hound.” This,
says Smith, requires time: “You have to be willing to do a lot of talking,
find different ways of saying the same thing, and be willing to repeat
256
yourself.” There is no need to “fear for the relationship” as long as
counsel makes it clear that, in the end, it is the client’s decision and

252. See Abbe Smith, “I Ain’t Takin’ No Plea”: The Challenges in Counseling Young People Facing
Serious Time, 60 Rutgers L. Rev. 11, 11 (2007).
253. See Smith, supra note 249.
254. Id. at 494.
255. Id. at 492.
256. Id.
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counsel will abide by that decision—even zealously defending the client
257
at trial if that is what the client decides to do.
Second, the decisions made by the client are extremely important
and counsel is therefore permitted, and even encouraged, to “[f]ilibuster,
258
plead, argue, cajole” and “[s]ometimes cry.”
Third, counsel should not worry about exerting too much pressure—
259
but should worry instead about “failing to exert enough.” With that in
mind, counsel may resort to forceful language, “even verbal abuse, even
260
yelling.” Indeed, “[b]adgering, cajoling, needling, riling, inciting—all
261
are methods that might help a client to finally see the light.”
To underscore the lengths to which Smith is willing to go in meeting
her persuasion goals, she concludes her list of tools with the following
thought: “I have mixed feelings about enlisting the judge or prosecutor to
262
help persuade the client, but I would not rule it out entirely.”
Resistance Strategy: This is yet another instance where the adage “A
263
tactic perceived is no tactic” seems to apply. Yes, it is difficult to
withstand the pressure that can result when a counterpart is relentless
and aggressive in her pleading, arguing, cajoling, badgering, needling,
and even crying. But one must learn to be resolute in the face of such
behaviors. This does not mean fighting back or “fighting fire with fire.”
Rather, it means remaining resolute. There might be reaction,
interaction, and conversation between the parties involved, but in the
end a party must remain unmoved in her position. It might be easier to
remain so if one implements Ury’s idea of “going to the balcony,” where
the use of “a mental attitude of detachment” allows one to “calmly
264
evaluate the conflict almost as if [she] were a third party.”

257. Id. See Nat’l Legal Aid & Defender Ass’n, Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense
Representation § 6.3(b) (1995) (“The decision to enter a plea of guilty rests solely with the client, and
counsel should not attempt to unduly influence that decision.”); see also ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice Prosecution Function & Defense Function § 4-5.2 cmt. at 201 (3d ed. 1993) (allowing the use of
“fair persuasion” but not “undue influence” in counseling a defendant to accept a plea bargain); Rodney
J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiator: A Systemic Approach, 2 Clinical L.
Rev. 73, 131 (1995) (“[H]ow hard counsel can lean turns on the seriousness of the case, the harm facing
the defendant, the client’s ability to make informed decisions, the certainty of the harm, the client’s
rationale for his or her decision and the means used to change the defendant’s mind.”).
258. Smith, supra note 249, at 493 (alterations in original) (quoting Kevin M. Doyle, Heart of the
Deal: Ten Suggestions for Plea Bargaining 70 (1999)).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 495.
263. Cohen, supra note 6, at 138.
264. Ury, supra note 51, at 37–38.
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Adding a Very Small Concession or “Deal Sweetener”

There are times when, after a great deal of back and forth in a
negotiation setting, adding a very small concession or “extra” to one’s
offer can finally tip the balance of the scales toward a “yes” from the
other side. This might be a small change in price or warranty, adding
extra training at no additional charge, or perhaps extending a sale price
for a short period of time.
Resistance Strategy: It is important to be mindful of how much value
the small “extra” is really bringing to the table. The bottom line is:
Perhaps the small “extra” is simply too small to legitimately influence the
outcome of the negotiation. In attempting to assess the situation, one
should ask the following four questions of himself or herself: (1) Why am
I suddenly willing to say yes just because the other side has thrown in a
small “extra” to the deal? (2) Is the tactic an appeal to my emotions
more than anything else—perhaps a way to cash in on the rapport and
relationship that have developed during the negotiation? (3) Am I
willing to say yes because I see their small “extra” as a sign that they
have hit their reservation point and therefore are not in a position to add
anything else of substance to their offer? And (4) am I correct in making
this assumption that they have hit their reservation point?
7.

Using Reference Anchors Creatively

Consider a student who is selling boxes of chocolates door-to-door
for a school fundraiser. If he knocks on a door and says, “Would you
please buy this $2 box of chocolates?,” the comparison price for the
potential customer is $0 (not buying anything at all)—an option many
people will decide upon. However, if the student were to say, “Can you
buy this $2 box of chocolates, or perhaps this larger $5 box?,” then the
comparison price for the $2 box becomes the high anchor price of $5, and
265
many customers will likely opt for the $2 box of chocolates.
The “door-in-the-face” influence technique works in a similar
fashion. The technique involves making a request so large it is very likely
266
to be rejected. However, immediately following the rejection, a smaller
request is made. The target’s rejection of the larger request makes
acceptance of the smaller request more likely.
In one experiment, for example, people were approached and asked
if they would be willing to volunteer two hours per week, for the next
two years, at a local juvenile detention center. As one might imagine,
267
nobody agreed to the request. However, 50% of those to whom the

265. See Thomas Mussweiler, The Malleability of Anchoring Effects, 49 Experimental Psychol.
67, 70–71 (2002).
266. O’Keefe, supra note 226, at 171; see Stanchi, supra note 76, at 426–27.
267. O’Keefe, supra note 226, at 171–72.
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request was made immediately agreed to a follow-up request, which was
to take a small group from the detention center to the zoo for two
268
hours. Only 17% of those in the control group, to whom no initial
269
request was made, agreed to the one-time zoo trip. Clearly, one of the
270
mechanisms at play in the technique is that the first, large request
presents a high reference anchor against which the smaller, follow-up
271
request can be favorably judged.
Resistance Strategy: Negotiators must try to evaluate all anchors, and
offers, separately and individually. If chocolate bars or toasters (or
anything else) are part of a negotiation, one must ask, “How would I
respond if each of these items or ideas were offered separately, or even on
separate days?” Thus, with the chocolate bars, how would one respond if
the $2 chocolate bar were offered separately, in complete isolation? Would
the offer be accepted? If not, then the fact that a $5 chocolate bar is also
offered will not influence the outcome of the negotiation.
Moreover, negotiators must work hard to evaluate anchors or offers
separately and individually even in cases like the “zoo” offer from above.
Although the recipient of the offers or requests might feel quite relieved
upon hearing the second, smaller request of a one-time, brief trip to the
zoo (and therefore feel almost obliged to accept such a comparatively
small request after being “let off the hook” for the very large initial
request), it is nonetheless still vital to consider each request or offer
separately and in isolation. Doing so enables the persuasion target to
quickly dismiss the initial (absurdly large) request and also to realize that
even the second, smaller request might not be reasonable or desirable to
accept in the given circumstance.

Conclusion
A core competency for people working in law or business is the
ability to influence and persuade: People need to become expert at
getting others to agree, to go along, to give in. The potential “targets” of
one’s influence throughout a given workday are seemingly endless,
including clients and customers, co-counsel, opposing counsel, supervisors,
direct reports, contractors, subcontractors, consultants, secretaries, judges,
juries, witnesses, police officers, and court personnel, to name a few.
Moreover, that influence is oftentimes exerted through words spoken
268. Id.
269. Id.; see Daniel J. O’Keefe, Guilt as a Mechanism of Persuasion, in The Persuasion
Handbook: Developments in Theory and Practice, supra note 20, at 329, 333.
270. Another mechanism at play in this technique is the notion of reciprocity, see supra notes 98–106
and accompanying text, whereby one feels compelled to return in kind a favor or nice gesture put forth by
another party. In this example, one might consider that decreasing the size of the request to a mere onetime zoo trip amounts to a favorable gesture that should be repaid by accepting the smaller request.
271. R.B. Cialdini et al., Reciprocal Concessions Procedure for Inducing Compliance: The Door-inthe-Face Technique, 31 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 206, 206 (1975).
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272

and behaviors exhibited within the context of a negotiation. And yet,
leading academics have argued that the vast majority of academic writing
273
on negotiation has ignored the element of interpersonal influence. This
Article has sought to correct this omission.
In setting forth various techniques of persuasion and their respective
defenses or antidotes, I have suggested that influence and persuasion can,
at times, be soft and subtle, and that even these softer techniques can have
dramatic impacts in terms of their ability to influence, to persuade, and to
change the outcome of a conversation or negotiation. In fact, in many
respects these softer strategies and tactics can have a greater impact than
the “hardball” tactics of yesterday’s negotiations—tactics that are usually
too obvious, too blunt, and too competitive to be effective in today’s more
savvy and sophisticated worlds of law and business.
I also want readers to focus on changes that are taking place in
everyday forms of communication and interaction (e.g., emailing, instant
messaging, and texting) and to see their potential usefulness as vehicles
of influence and persuasion, as well as their capacity for impacting how
people think, converse, and interact as negotiators work to build rapport,
trust (or distrust), knowledge, acceptance (or reactance), and, finally,
reputation within the context of their dealings.
This general awareness is a central teaching point of this Article; I
hope that readers hereafter will focus upon a particular question,
statement, or action during a negotiation and ask themselves, in that
moment, the following two questions: (1) Is what the other party is doing
or saying right now merely a tactic or strategy of persuasion? And
(2) how might I resist or defend myself against that strategy or tactic?
I suggest that this awareness, and the knowledge that flows from it,
truly equals power in the context of negotiation—power that can help
prevent negotiators from being taken advantage of by the persuaders
who employ various strategies and tactics of influence as they attempt to
get to yes and get what they want.
Those who are not aware that these techniques exist, and who
cannot recognize them and resist them, are placing themselves (and their
clients) at a clear disadvantage with respect to negotiation outcomes and
final settlement results. It is only by being able to recognize and respond
to various strategies and techniques of influence and persuasion that
negotiators can begin to resist their powers and nullify their impacts.
272. See Wetlaufer, supra note 54, at 1220 (“We lawyers are generally counted as successful in the
degree to which we are effective at producing instrumental results through our strategic speaking.”). I
would argue that nearly every interaction or conversation with another person constitutes a negotiation
(or at least a central building block of a negotiation)—including an opportunity to teach, to apprise, to
query, to build trust, rapport, and reputation, and to influence and persuade.
273. See Malhotra & Bazerman, supra note 9, at 510 (“[T]he vast majority of writing on negotiation
has ignored the element of interpersonal influence. Because negotiators spend a great deal of time trying
to persuade each other to agree to their desired outcome, this seems to be a glaring omission.”).
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